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Reassessing The Trade–Development Nexus In 
International Economic Law: The Paradigm Shift 
In Asia–Pacific Regionalism 
Pasha L. Hsieh* 
Abstract: This article reassesses the trade–development nexus in international 
economic law and provides the first examination of the approach to realize the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals through regional integration. It argues that the 
emerging New Regional Economic Order in the multipolar system will fortify the 
coalition of developing countries in structuring the legalization of pro-development 
trade policy. For decades, the misconceived concept of special and differential 
treatment has ignored the reality of the North–South Grand Bargain and disconnected 
the World Trade Organization from its development objectives. The development crisis 
of the Doha Round requires a feasible “Plan B” for the Global South. 
By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, this article opens an inquiry 
into the assertive role of developing countries that prompted the paradigm shift in Asia–
Pacific regionalism. The realist and dependency theories are utilized to decipher the 
geopolitical complexity of the rapidly evolving South–South free trade agreements. As 
a timely case study, the analysis is based on the creation of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations Economic Community and its implications for economic powers such as 
the United States and China. It provides an account of the bloc’s services trade-oriented 
development policy under the balance of power strategy. Finally, this article offers 
regulatory reform proposals on how to integrate development assistance and remove 
trade barriers. Transnational legal harmonization and human rights protection in line 
with international labor principles are also indispensable. Such reforms will strengthen 
the best practices for global regionalism and reinvigorate the trade–development 
connection in the multilateral trading system. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The convergence of economic liberalization and development policy 
has formed the cornerstone of multilateral trade negotiations and 
international economic law for decades. Geopolitical challenges remain 
when it comes to reconciling the mercantilist concept of enhancing market 
access with the principle of redistributive justice that demands preferential 
treatment.1 More fundamentally, the legalization of the trade–development 
nexus reflects the global North–South conflicts that underpin divergent 
national interests between developed and developing countries.2 
Unanimously adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 2015, the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development seeks to transform such long-standing 
conflicts to cooperation.3 With the aim to eradicate poverty and reinforce 
inclusive economic growth, the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
conceive of international trade as the essential development apparatus.4 The 
SDGs mandated the revitalization of development by completing the 
negotiations of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO).5 
Yet, states’ irreconcilable stances on liberalizing restrictions on agriculture, 
non-agricultural market access (NAMA), and services trade led the Doha 
Round talks to an unresolved standstill.6 From Seattle to Nairobi, the WTO 
Ministerial Conferences have generated more frustrations than 
achievements.7 The fate of the Doha Round hinges on whether it can achieve 
 
 1  For mercantilist and distributive justice concepts in international trade, see J. Michael Finger, The 
Uruguay Round North-South Bargain: Will the WTO Get over It?, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 301, 303–05 (Daniel L. M. 
Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002); Chantal Thomas, The Death of Doha? Forensics of 
Democratic Governance, Distributive Justice, and Development in the WTO, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS 185, 185–205 (Chios Carmody et al. 
eds., 2014). 
 2  See Deniz Altınbaş, South-South Cooperation: A Counter-Hegemonic Movement?, in THE RISE OF 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL, GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 
29, 29 n.1 (Justin Dargin ed., 2013) (explaining the North-South divide in global politics). 
 3  UN Adopts New Global Goals, Charting Sustainable Development for People and Planet by 2030, 
UN NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51968#.VkLue 
7crLrc. The Sustainable Development Goals that took effect January 1, 2016 were built upon Millennium 
Development Goals that governed the development agenda from 2000 to 2015. G.A. A/69/L.85 Draft 
Outcome Document of the United Nations Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2105 Development 
Agenda, at 3–7 (Aug. 12, 2015). 
 4  G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Sept. 
25, 2015) [hereinafter Sustainable Development Goals (2015)], Goals 1 & 8. 
 5  Id. at Goal 17. 
 6  Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
573, 577–83 (2010); ICTSD Reporting, LDC Group Outlines Priorities Ahead of WTO MC10, ICTSD 
(Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/ldc-group-outlines-priorities-
ahead-of-wto-mc10. 
 7  For the implications of the trade-development disconnect in the Doha Round, see Tomer Broude, 
The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational 
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the aspirational commitment to development in tandem with liberalizing 
trade under the WTO and free trade agreements (FTAs).8 
To understand the role of trade politics in shaping today’s global 
economic governance, it is pivotal to trace back to the origin of the North–
South clash in the UN and the WTO. The WTO’s predecessor, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Bretton Woods Institutions 
were established in the 1940s and provided the framework that governed 
postwar economic order.9 The most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and 
national treatment of the GATT crystalized the guiding principles for 
legalism of trade rulemaking.10 Developing countries’ demands that their 
development needs be met by making exceptions to the West-dominated 
mechanism were predominantly ignored in the 1940s.11 
The South decided to shift the battle to the UN. The proliferation of 
newly independent states in the postcolonial era bolstered developing 
countries’ political power to divert the GATT’s attention to “special and 
differential treatment” (SDT) for the South.12 The culmination of the 
movement was the 1974 UN declaration calling for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO).13 The NIEO principles symbolize the Westphalian 
concept and affirmative action in international economic law.14 On the one 
hand, the South asked for recognition of its sovereignty over trade policy; on 
the other hand, it requested an increase in financial and technological 
assistance from the North.15 
The NIEO soon failed because of the unified trans-Atlantic alliance vis-
à-vis the erosion of the South’s political solidarity due to the disparate 
 
Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 246–61 (2007); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, WTO 
Winners and Losers: The Trade and Development Disconnect, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 165, 168–77 (2008); 
Arun S, Stalemate Continues at WTO Meet in Nairobi, HINDU, (Dec. 20, 2015), 
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/stalemate-continues-at-wto-meet-in-nairobi/article 
8005357.ece.  
 8  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.  
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration], at paras. 1–6. 
 9  Bretton Woods Institutions refer to monetary institutions, including the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.  
 10  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (GATT 1994), arts. I & III. 
 11  See, e.g., Nicholas Lamp, The “Development” Discourse in International Trade Lawmaking, 
QUEEN’S UNIV. FACULTY OF L. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 2015-057, 2015, at 8–10 (indicating the 
US negotiators’ negative perception of “development” in the 1940s). 
 12  Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When, and 
How?, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 147, 148–49 (Simon J. 
Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006). 
 13  G.A. Res. S-6/3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) (May 1, 1974). 
 14  See id. art. 4 (stressing the countries’ “full permanent sovereignty”); ROBERT E. HUDEC, 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 101–02 (1987) (explaining developing countries’ 
request to rectify global economic inequalities and their emphasis on equality). 
 15  G.A. Res. S-6/3201, supra note 13, art. 4. 
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economic development of different nations and the debt crisis in the 1990s.16 
The rising Washington Consensus, which imposed neoliberal liberalization 
reform as a prerequisite for aid assistance from the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, further weakened the NIEO’s momentum.17 Arguably, the 
legacy of the NIEO resulted in the subsequent codification of SDT provisions 
during the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds.18 To “pay back” the developing 
countries for their sacrifice under the WTO’s single undertaking modality, 
the current Doha Development Agenda committed to making SDT “precise, 
effective and operational.”19 Nonetheless, the realpolitik of WTO 
negotiations has rendered this promise unpromising. 
Contrary to the South’s expectations, the 148 current SDT provisions of 
the WTO agreements contain predominantly “best endeavor” language and 
are rarely enforced as binding obligations in WTO disputes.20 The perceived 
failure to meet the development commitments inevitably undermines the 
legitimacy of the WTO and the implementation of the SDGs. To some extent, 
such failure is due to developing countries’ erroneous presumption that SDT 
provisions would eliminate or at least reduce pressure from free trade and 
thus benefit development policy. In essence, the policy space created under 
SDT arrangements hinders developing countries’ meaningful participation in 
multilateral trade negotiations.21 Without the “Grand Bargain” negotiations 
between the North and South, the developing nations’ restricted trade gains 
simply nullify the economic goal of pro-poor development and the human 
rights-oriented “right to development.”22 
Facing the global development crisis of the Doha Round and 
 
 16  Nils Gilman, The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction, 6 HUMANITY 1, 8 (2015); 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 67–68 (2014), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf. 
 17  SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51 (2012); Chantal 
Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman, Editors’ Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL 
SYSTEM 1, 9 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). 
 18  Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149–52; ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 72; The GATT Years: From 
Havana to Marrakesh, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last 
visited August 13, 2017). 
 19  Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, para. 44. 
 20  Committee on Trade and Development Special Session, Note by Secretariat: Special and 
Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WTO Doc. TN/CTD/W/33, at 3–
5 (June 8, 2010); Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions under 
the WTO Agreements, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12, 14–30 (George A. Bermann & 
Petro C. Mavroidis eds., 2007). 
 21  Michael Trebilcock, Between Theories of Trade and Development: The Future of the World 
Trading System 3 (Univ. of Toronto L. Working Paper No. 2014-10, 2014); Paul Collier, Why the WTO 
is Deadlocked: And What Can Be Done About It?, 29 WORLD ECON. 1423, 1434 (2006). 
 22  See Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for Future 
Negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
ROBERT E. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 285–89 (illustrating the “Grand Bargain” negotiations); G.A. Res. 
41/128, annex, Declaration on the Right to Development, arts. 2–3 (Dec. 4, 1986) (mandating the duty to 
formulate development policies). 
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international economic law, this article provides the first examination of how 
the SDGs can be achieved through regional integration. It argues that the 
emerging New Regional Economic Order (NREO) in multipolar governance 
will strengthen the ability of the coalition of developing countries to reinforce 
the legalization of trade–development policy.23 The article thus shifts the 
conventional trade–development debate centered on the WTO’s SDT to a 
related but new dimension: the development role of the South in an age of 
global regionalism. Distinct from the NIEO, the NREO, derived from the 
power shifts to the Asia–Pacific, does not aspire to challenge the normative 
foundation of WTO principles. Rather, it opens an inquiry into how 
developing countries utilize an assertive balance-of-power strategy to alter 
the embedded hub-and-spoke architecture for development purposes.24 
Geopolitical changes have propelled the paradigm shift from the NIEO 
and the NREO in international economic law and trade politics. First, the 
NREO aligns with the global movement from the United States-centric 
“unipolar moment” to multipolar trade governance.25 The United States’ 
hegemonic economic power has declined. Asia’s emerging powers, including 
China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have 
galvanized the Obama Administration’s “Pacific Century” Agenda.26 The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) formed part of the “pivot to Asia” strategy, 
despite the pact’s unpredictable future due to the Trump Administration’s 
changing stance.27 
 
 23  Some authors used the term, “New Regional Economic Order.” Nevertheless, none of them 
substantiate the claim or explain the nexus between development dimensions and contemporary Asia-
Pacific regionalism. See, e.g., Adriano R. Garcia, Toward a New Regional Economic Order in Asia and 
the Pacific, X J. PHIL. DEV. 45, 45–53 (1983); Greg Fry, ‘Pooled Regional Governance’ in the Island 
Pacific: Lessons from History, in PACIFIC ISLAND REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND GOVERNANCE 89, 92 
(Satish Chand ed., 2005); KUNIKO ASHIZAWA, JAPAN, THE US, AND REGIONAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
IN THE NEW ASIA: WHEN IDENTITY MATTERS 66 (2013). 
 24  See Richard Baldwin, Preferential Trading Arrangements, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 632, 640–41 (Amrita Narlikar et al. eds., 2012) (discussing regionalism 
and hub-and-spoke bilateralism). 
 25  For the unipolar and multipolar political analyses, see generally Charles Krauthammer, see The 
Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 23 (1992); William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International 
Law: Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2015). For recent changes 
to international investment law in the Asia-Pacific, see Julien Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics of 
International Investment Law—Structure and Dynamics of Rules and Arbitration on Foreign Investment 
in the Asia-Pacific Region, 47 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. REV. 563 (2015). 
 26  Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, 189 FOREIGN POL’Y 56, 60–61 (2011). 
 27  Id. at 62. The 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was finalized in October 2015. Jane 
Perlez, U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html?_r=0; 
David Nakamura, Obama Turns on Personal Appeal While Trying to Bolster His Pivot to Asia, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-tries-to-land-his-pivot-to-
asia/2015/11/20/e2222e62-8e8b-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html; Donald J. Trump, Presidential 
Memorandum Regarding Withdrawl of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations 
and Agreement, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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Second, compared with the economic slowdown in the United States 
and European Union (EU), the evolution of South–South trade cooperation 
in Asia has ascended to a new level and strengthened the multipolar moment 
in the international economic order. The ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are 
the most ambitious initiatives currently launched by developing countries. 
As innovative models for South–South FTAs, the AEC and the RCEP 
incorporate major Asia–Pacific powers and half of the world’s population.28 
These blocs consolidate currently fragmented FTAs in Asia–Pacific 
regionalism. Lastly, regional developing countries, including least developed 
countries (LDCs), have engaged in the Grand Bargain, expediting the shift 
from an import substitution policy to an export-oriented growth model. 
Regardless of different national strategies, the NREO’s pro-development 
liberalization has prompted an emerging realization among the developing 
countries that they should transform from the North–South conflicts to 
North–South collaboration, in line with the SDGs. 
Built upon Jagdish Bhagwati’s commentary on First and Second 
Regionalism, this article answers the question of the trade–development 
paradigm in Third Regionalism with both theoretical and substantive 
claims.29 Theoretically, I will apply realist and dependency theories to 
decipher the NREO and advance the understanding of South–South FTAs, 
which the existing literature barely examines. While realism addresses the 
transition from the pessimistic political rivalry to cooperation based on 
mutual interests, the new dependency theory sheds light on the economic 
transformation of neocolonial states.30 
Substantively, I will focus on the legal framework of ASEAN’s trade 
 
office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific. 
 28  The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) expects to consolidate the existing 
five free trade agreements (FTAs) that Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) concluded with 
China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand. The ASEAN Community, including the AEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), was established in 2015 and the RCEP will be concluded in 2016. Shujiro 
Urata, Constructing and Multilateralizing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Asian 
Perspective 3–13 (ADBI Working Paper No. 449, 2013); Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
[ASEAN], Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Community (Nov. 22, 2015), 
http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/KL-Declaration-on-Establishment-of-ASEAN 
-Community-2015.pdf, [hereinafter Kuala Lumpur Declaration (2015)]; Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations [ASEAN], Joint Statement on the RCEP Negotiations (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.asean.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/RCEP-Leaders-Joint-Statement_22-Nov-2015_ 
FINAL.pdf.  
 29  Bhagwati explains the first two waves of regionalism beginning in the 1960s and 1980s, 
respectively. Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15 WORLD ECON. 535, 538–42 
(1992). I propose that “Third Regionalism” from the 2000s to the present reflects the rapid development 
of Asia–Pacific regionalism, including the emergence of mega FTAs. 
 30  See generally Charles L. Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, 19 INT’L 
SECURITY 50, 50–53 (1995); Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 
231, 231–33 (1970). 
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liberalization as a timely case study for the NREO. As part of the Global 
South, Southeast Asia has become a political hot spot due to the South China 
Sea disputes and Myanmar’s democratization.31 The proliferation of FTAs is 
also integral to this geopolitical configuration. From a development 
perspective, the liberalization of services trade significantly reduces poverty 
and helps avoid the “middle income trap.”32 However, it is politically 
challenging to liberalize trade in services in the WTO and FTA arenas 
because of behind-the-border barriers. This article demonstrates how 
ASEAN states have incrementally liberalized the service sector for 
development goals on the basis of an “interlocked mechanism” between 
internal and external, region-based FTAs.33 As part of the South–South 
approach to implement the SDGs, the ASEAN experience provides 
developing countries a feasible “Plan B” by which to fortify the trade–
development connection amid the Doha Round impasse. 
This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, Part II provides 
the historical and geopolitical context of North–South conflicts and trade–
development debates in international economic law. It reassesses the 
misconception of SDT that led to the disconnect between the Doha Round 
negotiations and the SDGs. Based on the corollaries of realist and decency 
theories, it argues that the NREO, which emerged in the context of Third 
Regionalism, revitalizes pro-development trade liberalization for developing 
countries. Part III substantiates the paradigm shift by analyzing new trends 
among South–South FTAs in Asia–Pacific regionalism and focusing on the 
creation of the AEC as a key case study. It explains the evolution of 
ASEAN’s legal structure that galvanizes regional economic integration 
across diverse countries and examines the rationale for the services trade-
oriented policy as a development model. 
Part IV details the first efforts to provide a roadmap for realizing the 
SDGs through the legalization of trade–development policy in regional 
integration and highlights regulatory reform proposals for the post-2015 
agenda. To utilize the assertive balance of power strategy, ASEAN FTAs 
should operationalize multilateral development assistance and remove 
 
 31  The South China Sea disputes are not only between ASEAN claimant states and China but also 
involve conflicting national interests between the United States and China. E.g., James R. Holmes, 
China’s Monroe Doctrine, DIPLOMAT (June 22, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/chinas-monroe-
doctrine/. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party recently won the presidential election in Myanmar. Jonah Fisher, 
Myanmar Election: Suu Kyi’s NLD Wins Landslide Victory, BBC (Nov. 13, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34805806.  
 32 ASEAN SECRETARIAT & THE WORLD BANK, ASEAN INTEGRATION MONITORING REPORT 93 
(2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/915081468234873037/pdf/839140WP0P14480Box 
0382116B00PUBLIC0.pdf; ASEAN SECRETARIAT & THE WORLD BANK, ASEAN SERVICES 
INTEGRATION REPORT 1–2 (2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/759841468178459585/ 
pdf/100637-Revised-WP-PUBLIC-Box393257B-ASEAN-Report-web.pdf. 
 33  In my view, the “interlocked mechanism” refers to how the liberalization effects of ASEAN’s 
internal and external FTAs (ASEAN+1 FTAs) are mutually reinforcing.  
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domestic barriers to services trade. Essential actions also include the 
transnational legal harmonization on mutual recognition and immigration 
regulations and the legalization of human rights that incorporate international 
labor principles. Finally, the conclusion draws together these theoretical and 
substantive arguments and offers legal and policy advice for reinvigorating 
the trade–development nexus at the global stage. 
 II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TRADE–
DEVELOPMENT NEXUS 
The trade–development nexus has been acutely contested since the 
inception of the Bretton Woods system. This issue remains at the core of 
multilateral trade negotiations and implicates the fundamental differences in 
national interests between developed and developing countries. Before 
proceeding to the analysis of present challenges to global regionalism, it is 
vital to establish the theoretical framework for the trade–development 
debates in the context of North–South conflicts in international economic 
law. This article does so by reassessing the WTO’s SDT provisions in tandem 
with its alleged development goals and then explaining geopolitical 
dynamics under realist and dependency theories. 
 A. Unrealistic Promises in the Multilateral Trading System 
The SDGs adopted in 2015 established post-2015 UN targets for 
development on the basis of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The SDGs’ mandated the implementation of development goals through the 
Doha Round, which underscores the WTO’s development agenda.34 
However, the meaning and implementation of development through the 
WTO have been controversial, as the WTO does not intend to be a 
development organization. As an institution created for trade liberalization, 
the concept of development in the WTO discourse is often confined to special 
and differential treatment. Politically oriented SDT measures constitute an 
excuse for noncompliance with WTO principles and contravene the 
mercantilist premise of trade liberalization. 
 1. The Misconceived Concept of Special and Differential Treatment 
The misconceived notion of SDT has led to unrealistic development 
promises in multilateral trade negotiations. Structuring a sustainable trade–
development nexus requires a holistic understanding of development in the 
historical and geopolitical context. In contrast with the quantitative concept 
of trade, the multifaceted definition of development has been a subject of rife 
 
 34  Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goal 17. 
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debate. Various postwar theorists understood development as 
industrialization, modernization, or economic growth.35 Since the 1980s, the 
human rights approach to development has been gathering momentum.36 
Following the universal movement for the “right to development” and 
“sustainable development,” Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s Development as 
Freedom laid the new groundwork for development.37 Sen’s capability 
approach explains development as progress for removing “unfreedoms that 
leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their 
reasoned agency.”38 This perception expanded the prevailing view of 
development from the parochial definition of economic performance such as 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to multiple factors that influence 
development.39 Sen’s theoretical framework contributed to the creation of 
measurable development parameters in the UN Human Development Index 
and the MDGs.40 
To eliminate what Sen called “unfreedoms,” the trade–development 
linkage concerns the implementation of development through international 
trade that maximizes economic growth and reduces poverty. From a broader 
perspective, the urge for development in the multilateral trading system seeks 
to compromise the North–South conflicts in international economic law. 
SDT provisions that accord developing countries proportional equality 
represent the political compromise on such conflicts. In the GATT era, the 
creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) symbolized the collective power of the South in shaping trade 
norms dominated by developed nations.41 With the support of the developing 
countries known as the “Group of 77” (G77), Raúl Prebisch, the UNCTAD’s 
secretary general, pushed for the NIEO movement that demanded a “just and 
 
 35  See JAN NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, DEVELOPMENT THEORY: DECONSTRUCTIONS/ 
RECONSTRUCTIONS 5–8 (2d ed. 2010) (detailing theories and meanings of development from the 1800s 
to 2000). 
 36  Paul J. Nelson, At the Nexus of Human Rights and Development: New Methods and Strategies of 
Global NGOs, 31: 12 WORLD DEV. 2013, 2014–15 (2003); ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 25–26. 
 37  See generally Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 22; Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future (1987); Human Rights Approaches 
to Sustainable Development, NGLS Roundup 90 (2002), at 1–2; AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS 
FREEDOM (1999). 
 38  SEN, supra note 37, at xii.  
 39  See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6:2 J. HUMAN DEV. 151, 153–54 (2005) 
(discussing the capability approach); Faizel Ismail, Mainstreaming Economic Development in the Trading 
System, ECON. DEV. & MULTILATERAL TRADING COOPERATION 213, 214 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard 
M. Hoekman eds., 2016) (explaining Sen’s definition of development). 
 40  UNDP, THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 16–28 (2010), 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf. 
 41  See A Brief History of UNCTAD, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://unctad.org/en/ 
Pages/About%20UNCTAD/A-Brief-History-of-UNCTAD.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) (“The first 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was held in Geneva in 1964.”). 
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equitable” economic order.42 
In essence, the South demanded absolute sovereignty and requested 
justified exceptions to principal trade norms, including the MFN principle. 
The UNCTAD did contribute to the enactment of “Part IV: Trade and 
Development” of the GATT in 1965.43 As a paramount SDT doctrine, the 
nonreciprocity principle requires developed countries not to “expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them” in trade negotiations with less-
developed countries.44 The other landmark decision to codify SDT rights was 
the GATT’s adoption of the 1979 Enabling Clause that provided for 
preferential market access.45 This decision permanently authorized members 
to grant developing countries preferential treatment under the generalized 
system of preferences (GSP) schemes.46 
Notwithstanding the UNCTAD achievements in advancing the agenda 
of the South, the NIEO movement waned as a result of the G77’s diverging 
economic interests and the Thatcher–Reagan alliance’s refusal to accede to 
the NIEO demands.47 The NIEO gave way to the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus that imposed free market reform on developing countries.48 The 
Uruguay Round, which established the WTO, sharply diverted from previous 
negotiations by adopting the “take it or leave it” modality, known as the 
single undertaking approach. Absent bargaining power, developing countries 
were compelled under multiple WTO agreements to assume daunting 
obligations in various areas ranging from services to intellectual property. 
The implementation problem, which resulted in a strong sense of betrayal, 
could not be overcome by additional SDT provisions that allowed technical 
assistance and longer transition periods.49 
 
 42  Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149; Gilman, supra note 16, at 3–5; Declaration on the 
Establishment of a NIEO, supra note 13, arts. 4(j) & 5. 
 43  Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149; ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 70. 
 44  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (GATT 1994), art. XXXVI:8. 
 45  Differential and More Favorable Treatment of Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903, Nov. 28, 1979 [hereinafter Enabling Clause]. Contracting parties of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) adopted the permanent Enabling Clause after the 1971 
decision that granted a ten-year waiver allowing generalized system of preferences (GSP) to depart from 
GATT norms. Generalized System of Preferences, Decision of 25 June 1971, L/3545, June 28, 1971. 
 46  See generally Gene M. Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, A Preference for Development: The Law and 
Economics of GSP, 4:1 WORLD TRADE REV. 41, 41–43 (2005). 
 47  Trade and Development Report (2014), at 67–68; JAMES M. CYPHER, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 238 (4th ed. 2014). 
 48  The neoliberal package of the Washington Consensus includes ten points such as the liberalization 
of trade and foreign direct investment. John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, 
THE WASH. CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14, 16–17 (Narcís 
Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008). 
 49  See Don McRae, Developing Countries and ‘The Future of the WTO, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 603, 603 
(2005) (“The Uruguay Round is often portrayed as a betrayal.”); J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, 
Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 24:4 WORLD ECON. 511, 
514 (2000) (stating the South has “taken on bound commitments to implement in exchange for unbound 
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 2. The WTO–Sustainable Development Goals Disconnect 
The trade–development convergence is presumed to have entered a new 
stage during the Doha Round. However, the SDT-focused agenda 
disconnected the WTO from the SDGs. Economically, the Doha 
Development Agenda was expected to rectify the unfairness of the Uruguay 
Round and facilitate the conclusion of current negotiations. Politically, after 
the September 11 terrorist attacks, fostering development and eliminating 
poverty were perceived to be effective responses for fighting extremism.50 
Moreover, the UN has constantly stressed the WTO’s role in realizing the 
MDGs and SDGs.51 
Given the proliferating SDT measures, the central question is whether 
Doha development targets can be achieved. The answer is in the negative. 
First, WTO development goals remain unachievable promises as a result of 
the mismatch of expectations. The nonreciprocity principle ignores political 
reality and ultimately undermines developing countries’ participation in 
multilateral trade negotiations. Without the Grand Bargain, the South only 
garnered limited market access to developed markets and thus their export-
led growth is essentially restricted.52 
Second, GSP preferences are often eroded by economic and political 
considerations. In theory, the Enabling Clause provides a deviation from the 
MFN principle.53 This fundamental issue was raised in EC-Tariff 
Preferences, in which India challenged the European GSP scheme.54 The 
Enabling Clause merely stipulates that donor countries “may” grant 
preferential treatment to developing countries, meaning it imposes “no legal 
obligation” for providing the GSP.55 Furthermore, GSP benefits may 
unilaterally differ in order to “respond positively” to developing countries’ 
development needs, and such needs are subject to the sole discretion of the 
developed countries.56 In practice, the U.S. and EU GSP systems have 
excluded eligible countries that crossed economic benchmarks under the 
graduation method and restricted those countries’ market access, owing to 
 
commitments of assistance”); Chantal Thomas & Joel P Trachtman, supra note 17, at 8–10 (discussing 
the emergence of new special and differential treatment (SDT) in the Uruguay Round). 
 50  Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45:1 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 8–9 (2009); Cho, supra note 6, at 574. 
 51  G.A. Res. 55/2, Millenium Declaration, at 8–9 (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Millenium 
Development Goals (2000)]; Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goal 17. 
 52  See generally Ostry, supra note 22, at 285–89; HUDEC, supra note 14, at 179–85. 
 53  Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, para. 1, L/4903 GATT BISD (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980). 
 54  Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, adopted Apr. 20, 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS246/AB/R, DSR 2004:III [EC – Tariff Preferences], at 1009. 
 55  Id. at para. 7.38. 
 56  Id. at para. 165; Grossman & Sykes, supra note 46, at 51–52. 
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domestic protectionist demands.57 
Third, Uruguay Round-created SDT measures suffer from inherent 
weaknesses in their design. These measures predominantly neglect the link 
between countries’ technical assistance needs and their capacity to 
implement WTO obligations.58 The transition periods under WTO 
agreements are also arbitrarily determined.59 Most technical assistance 
projects increase awareness of WTO law by offering educational courses, but 
fail to advise WTO members how to conduct trade reform, which requires 
knowledge beyond WTO rules. 
Finally, most SDT provisions encourage developed countries to “give 
every effort” or “particular attention” to the needs of developing countries.60 
Such hortatory obligations are rarely enforced in WTO disputes. For 
example, in China-Raw Materials, China invoked the development argument 
in justifying its export constraints on raw materials such as bauxite and zinc.61 
The legal basis on which Beijing relied was Article XXXVI:5, one of the 
trade and development provisions in Part IV of the GATT.62 Nevertheless, 
the panel rejected the argument, explaining that Article XXXVI:5 does not 
assist in the interpretation of Article XI and Article XX(g).63 
The rare incidences in which an SDT has been recognized relate only to 
nonsubstantive issues. In Indonesia-Autos, the arbitrator noted the “interests 
of developing country Members” requirement under Article 21.2 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding.64 The “reasonable period of time” for 
 
 57  For the explanations of the US and European Union (EU) GSP schemes, see Caf Dowlah, Trade 
Preferences and Economic Growth: An Assessment of the U.S. GSP Schemes in the Context of Least 
Developed Countries, in LAW AND DEV. PERSPECTIVE ON INT. TRADE LAW 334, 337–50 (Yong-Shik Lee 
et al. eds., 2011); Grossman & Sykes, supra note 46, at 44–47. 
 58  The only exception is Section II of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (2014). See Azevêdo 
Launches New WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility to Deliver Support to LDCs and Developing 
Countries, WTO (July 22, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/fac_22jul14_e.htm 
(“For the first time in WTO history, the requirement to implement the Agreement was directly linked to 
the capacity of the country to do so.”). 
 59  For instance, longer transition periods were granted to developing countries under the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. World Trade Report 2014 – Trade 
and Development: Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO (2014) [hereinafter World Trade Report 
(2014)], at 194–95. 
 60  E.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), art. XXXVII:3(a) & the TBT 
Agreement (1995), art. 12.2. Among the 148 SDT provisions in WTO agreements, the GATT and the 
TBT Agreement include most SDT provisions. Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO 
Agreements and Decisions, supra note 20, at 5. 
 61  Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, 
adopted Feb. 22, 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / 
WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, at 3501, para. 7.275-404. 
 62  Id.  
 63  Id. 
 64  Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry – 
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Indonesia to implement the WTO decision was therefore extended by six 
months.65 To the dismay of developing countries, it is impractical to 
transform the promises of the Doha Ministerial Declaration to operationalize 
SDT provisions into making them mandatory.66 The far-reaching 
redistributive transformation of according all SDT provisions binding 
authority will damage the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system 
that underpins the rule-based trading system. 
 B. Power Shifts in the Age of Global Regionalism 
The unrealistic promises of development in the Doha Round are the 
result of the SDT-centered approach. This flawed approach, underpinned by 
an erroneous assumption of developing countries that SDT provisions are 
enforced, is politically correct but unrealistic in multilateral trade 
negotiations. The Doha Round deadlock, entrenched by agriculture and 
NAMA issues, has crippled the chances of realizing the SDGs through the 
WTO. At this juncture, a “Plan B” for accomplishing development goals is 
becoming an urgent global matter. Against this background, I argue that the 
emerging NREO serves as a feasible alternative for strengthening pro-
development trade policy. Based on realist and dependency theories, the 
contemporary South–South cooperation in Asia–Pacific regionalism 
signifies a paradigm shift in the trade–development nexus. The legal 
experiments, intertwined with geopolitical complexities, provide valuable 
lessons for the Global South such as Africa and Latin America. 
 1. Geopolitical Dimensions in the Doha Round 
This article thus shifts the traditional trade–development debate to a 
new dimension related to the role of developing countries in global 
regionalism. Traditionally, developing countries have favored 
multilateralism, as regionalism strengthens the power of the developed 
nations due to their “divide and conquer” strategy in bilateral negotiations. 
The NREO is changing the paradigm. Sharing the aspiration of the NIEO, 
the NREO fortifies the collective power of developing countries. However, 
distinct from the NIEO, the NREO does not challenge the normative 
principles of trade norms by requesting SDT exceptions. Instead, the NREO 
pursues development goals through deep integration in FTAs and 
reconstructs the neo-colonial dependency of the South on the North. 
Bhagwati coined the term “First Regionalism” in reference to the 
 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12, 
Dec. 7, 1998, DSR 1998:IX, at 4029, paras. 23–24. 
 65  Id. at para. 25. 
 66  See generally Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, at para. 44. 
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proliferation of FTAs in the 1960s and explained their collapse as a result of 
the nations’ having unduly placed political considerations ahead of trade 
liberalization.67 In “Second Regionalism” in the 1980s, Bhagwati observed 
the relative success of the EU’s single market and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) because of their strong economic motivations.68 
In my view, the NREO has surfaced in “Third Regionalism,” which has 
coincided with the Doha Round since the 2000s.69 The five-fold growth of 
trade pacts in the past two decades leading to 406 FTAs in 2015 demonstrates 
the significance of global regionalism.70 Third Regionalism encompasses 
distinct characteristics. Representing 75% of FTAs worldwide, the FTAs 
between developing countries (South–South FTAs) have substantially 
outpaced the agreements between developed countries and developing 
countries (North–South FTAs).71 
In contrast with the first two waves of regionalism, almost 80% of 
South–South FTAs expedite liberalization through WTO-plus components in 
the absence of the North’s political pressure.72 Also notably, the mega FTAs 
that focus on the Asia–Pacific region are becoming a game changer in 
international economic law.73 By solving the balkanization of bilateral FTAs, 
the mega FTAs have established new global norms and rendered the decline 
of the WTO in political discourse. 
Structural geopolitical transitions led to the NREO, which marks the 
feature of Third Regionalism. Emerging Asian regionalism transformed the 
world to multipolar economic governance.74 Following FTAs with Singapore 
and Australia, the “pivot to Asia” policy reinforced the United States’ 
 
 67  Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 538–39. For the elaboration on the First Regionalism, refer to 
Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on 
Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 426–57 (2001). 
 68  Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 540–42. Other examples in the Asia-Pacific include ASEAN Free 
Trade Area and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 
2011, The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence (2011) [hereinafter 
World Trade Report (2011)], at 52–53. 
 69  Again, what I called “Third Regionalism” refers to the development of Asia-Pacific FTAs from 
the 2000s to the present.  
 70  The number of FTAs increased from approximately 50 in the 1990s to more than 250 in 2010. 
World Trade Report (2011), supra note 68, at 55; WTO Secretariat, Free Trade Agreements, Facts & 
Figures, Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the World, 1948–2015, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2015). 
 71  South-South FTAs represented only 20% of FTAs in the 1970s and North-North FTAs currently 
represent barely 10%. World Trade Report (2011), supra note 68, at 55–56.  
 72  See Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai, Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism 8–9 (ADBI 
Working Paper Series, No. 431, 2013) (concluding that 77% of surveyed Asian FTAs are WTO-plus, 
including some or all Singapore issues). 
 73  In addition to Asia-Pacific focused mega FTAs, including the TPP and the RCEP, the US and the 
EU are currently negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. 
 74  For the development of Asian regionalism, see generally Asian Development Bank, Emerging 
Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity (2008). 
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rebalance towards the economic power of the Asia–Pacific by concluding its 
FTA with Korea and the TPP.75 The EU, which formed a trans-Atlantic 
alliance for global trade, also followed the trend by signing FTAs with Asian 
partners.76 Consequently, Washington and Brussels moved from their 
antagonistic stance on the NIEO to a more receptive posture of the emerging 
NREO.77 
In the new multipolar structure, developing countries have maneuvered 
a balance of power policy by augmenting their collective power through a 
new hub-and-spoke system. South–South cooperation consolidates the bloc 
by cementing internal and external FTAs, mutually reinforcing their levels 
of trade liberalization. The notion of “ASEAN centrality” exemplifies the 
convergence of the inward economic integration and outward agreements 
with regional powers such as China, Japan, and India.78 Moreover, divergent 
from their pessimistic requests focusing on SDT in the WTO, selected 
developing countries, including LDCs, have engaged in the market access-
based Grand Bargain and benefited from South-centered regionalism. The 
impressive poverty reduction of Cambodia and Vietnam epitomizes the 
resultant trade-led growth.79 The elevation of ASEAN’s aggregated 
economic power, in turn, reinforces the blocs’ bargaining capacity with the 
North in global negotiations. 
 2. Realist and Dependency Theories 
To respond to these contemporary challenges to international economic 
law, I offer theoretical explanations for the trade–development nexus in the 
NREO. Political theorists have conventionally stressed the development 
dimensions of North–South trade.80 This research enriches the existing 
 
 75  See generally WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356, FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 1–8 (2014); Shihoko 
Goto, South Korea and the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia, Apr. 3, 2013, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/south-korea-and-the-us-pivot-to-asia (last visited Dec. 2, 2015). 
 76  The EU concluded FTAs with South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam. European Commission, Trade 
for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (2015), at 31–32. 
 77 See Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Relations (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/11/21/fact-sheet-us-asean-relations (“The United States supports ASEAN’s central role in 
many of the region’s key institutions and works closely with ASEAN to strengthen Asia’s regional 
architecture.”). 
 78  See Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (2012) (“Negotiations for the RCEP will recognize ASEAN Centrality in the emerging 
regional economic architecture and the interests of ASEAN’s FTA Partners . . . .”). The RCEP will 
materialize ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 initiatives. Urata, supra note 28, at 1–9. 
 79  OECD, Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2013 – With Perspectives on China and India: 
Narrowing Development Gaps (2013), at 246–48; Sok Siphana, Mainstreaming Trade for Poverty 
Alleviation: A Cambodian Experience, 2 DEV. OUTREACH 7, 8–9 (2003). 
 80  Trade-development debates on North-South trade, which focuses on the relations between the EU 
and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, will be discussed below. 
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literature by examining the latest development of South–South trade.81 The 
realist and dependency theories will be utilized to explain the comparison 
between the NREO, which prompts South–South cooperation, and the NIEO, 
which hinges on North–South conflicts. 
Represented by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, realism is one of 
the oldest theories of political science.82 Realists define the international 
system as an anarchy that makes self-help essential for the survival of the 
countries.83 As rational actors, states pursue their power according to their 
national interests in the hegemonic world.84 Realism also influences 
mercantilism in international political economy by perceiving global trade as 
a zero-sum game that compels nations to maximize their economic benefits.85 
The dependency school shares the realist angle of national interests but 
interprets the international system from a South-based perspective.86 
According to Dos Santos and Prebisch who advocated the NIEO, the 
“underdevelopment” dilemma is due to the unequal neo-colonial trade 
relationship between dominant and subordinate economies.87 Dependency 
theorists contended that the ongoing external unfairness has subjected the 
development of developing countries to the interests of developed 
countries.88 International trade only aggravates such dependency and the 
inequality among nations by escalating the flow of the South’s economic 
 
 81  The existing literature on South-South trade is either outdated or fails to analyze the development 
dimensions from a theoretical perspective. See e.g., David Greenaway & Chris Milner, South-South 
Trade: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 1 WORLD BANK OBSERVER 47 (1990); James Scott, South-South 
Trade and North-South Politics: Emerging Powers and the Reconfiguration of Global Governance (BWPI 
Working Paper, No. 131, 2010). 
 82  Realism is primarily based on HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1954) and 
KENNETH WALTZ’S THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). William C. Wohlforth, Realism, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131, 132–37 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan 
Snidal eds., 2008). 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id.; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale, International Relations, Principal Theories, 
in Oxford Public International Law: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e722?rskey= 
X2BUQa&result=1&prd=EPIL (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); Robert Keohane, Theory of World Politics: 
Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 198–99 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). 
 85  INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POWER AND PURPOSE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 194 (Paul D’Anieri ed., 
2011). 
 86  See ALAN GILBERT, MUST GLOBAL POLITICS CONSTRAIN DEMOCRACY? GREAT-POWER 
REALISM, DEMOCRATIC PEACE, AND DEMOCRATIC INTERNATIONALISM 32–33 (1999); ALVIN Y. SO, 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND WORLD-SYSTEM THEORIES 
91–98 (1990). 
 87  Dos Santos, supra note 30, at 232–34; see also FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, 
DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 16–17 (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans.1979); 
GAVIN FRIDELL, FAIR TRADE COFFEE: THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF MARKET-DRIVEN SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 31 (2007). 
 88  SO, supra note 86, at 95–102. 
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surplus to the North.89 
As the significant model for North–South trade–development relations, 
the 1975 Lomé Convention was signed between the EU and former colonies, 
collectively known as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.90 
The Lomé Convention responded to NIEO demands by incorporating SDT 
that granted preferential treatment to ACP exports.91 Fundamental changes 
galvanized the EU’s policy shift. First, the EU lost the “banana war” in the 
GATT and the WTO, in which non-ACP countries challenged the legality of 
the EU’s preferential banana quotas for ACP countries.92 These cases 
mandated the revision of the WTO-inconsistent policy. Second, the fact that 
ACP countries could not “even maintain market share in the EU” evidences 
the futility of development goals of the Lomé Convention.93 Development 
thinking of major EU countries, including Germany and the United 
Kingdom, also changed from attaching ties with former European colonies 
to stressing the needs of the LDCs and alleviating global poverty.94 For these 
reasons, the EU revolutionarily replaced the non-reciprocity policy with the 
reciprocal Cotonou Agreement and its related Economic Partnership 
Agreements in the 2000s.95 
From the viewpoints of realist and dependency theories, the failure of 
the EU scheme illustrates the structural weaknesses of development policy 
in North–South trade agreements. The asymmetry of the bargaining power 
 
 89  Id. 
 90  See generally Ole Elgström, Lomé and Post-Lomé: Asymmetric Negotiations and the Impact of 
Terms, 5 EURO. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 175, 175–77 (2000); Maurzio Carbone & Jan Orbie, Beyond 
Economic Partnership Agreements: The European Union and the Trade-Development Nexus, 1 
CONTEMP. POL. 1, 1–2 (2014). 
 91  Tony Heron, Trading in Development: Norms and Institutions in the Making/Unmaking of 
European Union-African, Caribbean and Pacific Trade and Development Cooperation, in THE TRADE-
DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN THE EUROPEAN: DIFFERENTIATION, COHERENCE AND NORMS 10, 12–13 
(Maurzio Carbone & Jan Orbie eds., 2015). 
 92  For the introduction to Banana cases, see Simi T.B. & Atul Kaushik, The Banana War at the 
GATT/WTO, TRADE L. BRIEF, No. 1 (2008), at 1–4; Banana War Ends after 20 Years, BBC (Nov. 8, 
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20263308. See also Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, ‘We 
Care about you, but . . .’: The Politics of EU Trade Policy and Development, 3 CAM. REV. INT’L AFF. 
497, 501–02 (2013) (detailing the impact of the 1994 GATT case on the EU’s ACP policy). 
 93  European Commission Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP 
Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, at 9–21, COM 
(96) 570 final (Nov. 20, 1996). 
 94  For positions of major EU countries, see Elgström, supra note 90, at 188–89; Young & Peterson, 
supra note 92, at 501. 
 95  Committee on Trade and Development, Note by the Secretariat: Information on the Utilisation of 
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4 (Feb. 7, 
2002), at 12–13. Even the new Economic Partnership Agreements resulted in limited welfare gains in the 
Caribbean Community where only the Dominican Republic expanded exports to the EU because of 
relative competitive products. Sheldon McLean et al., Trade and Development Nexus: Reflections on the 
Performance of Trade in Goods under the CARIFORUM-European Union Partnership Agreement: A 
CARIFORUM Perspective, U.N. Doc. LC/CAR/L.458 (Dec. 16, 2014), at 7, 23. 
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between the EU and ACP countries allowed the former to dictate the terms 
of the agreements based on European national interests.96 Preferential trade 
relations with the EU magnified its normative power rather than addressing 
the development needs of the South. In essence, the Europe-centric 
“development-friendly” regime distorted ACP countries’ effective resource 
allocation and hindered industrialization. The economic flow to Europe was 
expedited because the value of industrial imports substantially outweighed 
that of agricultural exports, thus exacerbating ACP countries’ dependency on 
Europe. 
The evolution of the NREO is based on the changing nature of South–
South trade. Prebisch argued for South–South trade as a means to end 
developing countries’ dependency on developed countries, but this position 
waned following the NIEO’s failure.97 The economic rationale for South–
South trade includes decreasing the dependency on the North by diversifying 
risks and increasing self-reliance through the import substitution policy.98 
Given limited domestic markets, it became essential for developing countries 
to expand the suitable overseas market, where they would not suffer from a 
weaker comparative advantage.99 Commentators have criticized the 
development potential in South–South trade on the ground that the validity 
of such arrangements is confined by economies of scale and the prevalent use 
of non-tariff-barriers (NTBs).100 The NREO development refutes this 
pessimistic contention. 
The NREO emerged in Third Regionalism with different geopolitical 
complexities. South–South trade grew from 8% to 25% of international trade, 
and the proliferation of Asia–Pacific FTAs in the Doha Round reflects this 
trend.101 The paradigm shift in a high degree of Asia–Pacific regionalism 
provides an impetus for the trade–development linkage. Realism posits that 
competition necessitated by “self-help” makes it difficult for countries to 
cooperate on trade liberalization.102 Nevertheless, cooperation can be a 
 
 96  See Katharina Serrano, The Trade-Development Nexus in EU-Pacific Relations: Realism, 
Dependence or Interdependence, 1 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 89, 107–09 (2011) (analyzing 
the EU’s bargaining power and self-interests). 
 97  Adekeye Adebajo, Two Prophets of Regional Integration: Prebisch and Adedeji, in 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS, EXPERIENCE, AND PROSPECTS 323, 328 (Bruce Currie-Alder et 
al. eds., 2014). 
 98  Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 539; Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49–50; Mehdi Shafaeddin, 
South-South Regionalism and Trade Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, UNDP Regional Centre in 
Colombo (2008), at 5–7.  
 99  Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49–50. Cf. Shafaeddin, supra note 98, at viii, 5–8. 
 100 See, e.g., ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 267–68; Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49–50.  
 101 See World Trade Report (2014), supra note 59, at 42 (stating that “South-South trade . . . has grown 
from 8 per cent of world trade in 1990 to around 25 per cent today, and is projected to reach 30 per cent 
by 2030”); see also World Trade Report (2011), supra note 68, at 59 (indicating the increase of Asia-
based FTAs). 
 102 See Glaser, supra note 30, at 50–51 (discussing the realist view of cooperation in security issues).  
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salient way of self-help when national interests overlap.103 Driven by 
geographic proximity and comparable economic levels, South–South trade 
likely involves less of the economic conflict inherent in North–South trade. 
The convergence of trade and development interests has prompted the 
conclusion of a new generation of WTO-plus South–South FTAs. The 
inclusion of emerging markets in the Asia–Pacific improves economies of 
scale and consolidates regional supply chains. 
The dependency theory may not fully explain the progression of North–
South relations in the NREO. The classical dependency school suggests that 
as dominant–subordinate relations perpetuate underdevelopment of the 
South, the only “way out” is to sever trade ties with developed countries.104 
Despite the structural weaknesses in North–South trade, the development 
impact of capital and technology from developed nations cannot be utterly 
disregarded. This isolation stance also contradicts the evolution of export-
oriented Asian economies and their trans-regional FTAs with the United 
States and the EU. 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Thomas Gold propounded the “new 
dependency theory,” which acknowledges the co-existence of dependency 
and development.105 Unlike the classical theory, which is preoccupied with 
the external unequal condition, the new theory focuses on the impact of 
evolving internal structures on altering the South’s relations with the 
North.106 Dependency is dynamic, as developing countries can effectively 
transform dependent capitalism to a neo-liberal export-oriented economy.107 
The South’s high value-added exports, such as IT products, have helped 
reverse the traditional North-bound economic flow. Supply chain 
adjustments in accordance with South–South FTAs also increases cost 
competitiveness in developed markets. Hence, the new dependency theory 
offers a theoretical response to the NREO, as developing countries 
collectively reconstruct the conventional dominant–subordinate relations by 
formulating a pro-development trade scheme. 
 III. THE PARADIGM SHIFT: IN SEARCH OF THE NEW 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
The Doha Round has failed to cement the trade–development nexus in 
 
 103 Id. at 53; Serrano, supra note 96, at 111. 
 104 SO, supra note 86, at 104–05. 
 105 See generally FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO, REINVENTING DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL (1999); 
THOMAS BARON GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE (1986); SO, supra note 86, at 164–
65. 
 106 Serrano, supra note 96, at 104; SO, supra note 86, at 137–42. 
 107 Gold examined Taiwan’s development model and explained how the country transformed its 
dependent relations with Japan and the United States to become a neoliberal export-oriented economy. 
See generally GOLD, supra note 105, at 21–90; SO, supra note 86, at 157–64. 
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the WTO. The flawed approach to development through SDT overlooks the 
reality of the Grand Bargain in the multilateral trading system. The NREO 
that surfaced in Third Regionalism provides a feasible “Plan B” for 
developing countries. By legalizing pro-development policy in FTAs, South–
South cooperation reflects the latest development in Asia–Pacific FTAs and 
signifies the developing countries’ changing position from rule-takers to 
rule-makers in international economic law. The case study of ASEAN will 
substantiate the expectations of realism and the new dependency theory. The 
creation of the AEC reinforces a paradigm shift in Asia–Pacific regionalism 
based on ASEAN+1 FTAs and provides the Global South with critical 
lessons to implement the SDGs through services trade-oriented development 
policy. 
 A. The Creation of the ASEAN Economic Community 
As a crucial pillar of the ASEAN Community, the establishment of the 
AEC in 2015 marked a milestone for South–South FTAs and global 
regionalism.108 The AEC fortifies the multipolar structure in international 
economic law, since the bloc moves toward forming one of the world’s four 
largest economies, following the United States, the EU and China.109 
Tellingly, a vast development gap exists between the six original nations 
(ASEAN-6) and the four newer LDC members—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam (CLMV countries).110 It is therefore crucial for the AEC to 
design a legal framework that implements the SDGs in economic integration 
balanced with diverse development needs. 
The founding of ASEAN in 1967 was primarily driven by political 
rather than economic considerations to form solidarity against the spread of 
communism and to peacefully settle territorial disputes.111 The post-colonial 
mindset energized the “ASEAN way” of alliance that emphasizes non-
 
 108 See Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, Kuala Lumpur Declaration (2015), supra note 28 
(“D[eclaring] the formal establishment of the ASEAN Community on 31 December 2015.”). The ASEAN 
Community consists of the AEC, the ASEAN Political-Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community. Id. 
 109 See Lord Davies, UK-ASEAN Business Council, in INVESTING IN ASEAN 11, 11 (2013–14) (“The 
ten ASEAN member states currently have a combined [Gross Domestic Product (GDP)] similar to the 
UK’s, and by 2030, the ASEAN economy is predicted to be the fourth largest single market after the EU, 
US and China”). 
 110 “ASEAN-6” countries include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. GDP per capita of Singapore is 44 times that of Myanmar in 2014. Table 7: Gross Domestic 
Product Per Capita in ASEAN, at Current Prices (Nominal), in US Dollars (2015), 
http://asean.org/storage/2015/09/table7.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2017). 
 111 RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN SEARCH OF AN ASEAN COMMUNITY: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE FORMER ASEAN SECRETARY-GENERAL 1-7 (2006). For intra-ASEAN territorial disputes, see 
Walter Woon, Resolving Territorial Disputes in ASEAN, 30 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 1, 
3–10 (2012). 
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intervention and consensus-based principles.112 ASEAN’s soft-law approach 
based on horizontal integration features its significant difference from the 
EU, which has followed a hard-law, top-down approach to achieve the 
economic union.113 In 1992, faced with global regionalism and the rise of 
China and India, ASEAN countries switched their focus to economic 
integration by forging the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).114 Nonetheless, 
the effectiveness of the AFTA was undermined by the low rate of utilization 
because of insignificant margins of preferences and complex procedures to 
qualify the rules of origin.115 
In 2007, ASEAN bolstered the integration by approving the ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint (AEC Blueprint 2015), which set 2015 as 
the target for forming “a single market and production base.”116 The adoption 
of the ASEAN Charter formally transformed the loosely connected bloc into 
an internal governmental institution that accelerated achievement of the AEC 
goals.117 Due to the EU’s embedded problems with the euro crisis and border 
control, the AEC envisions becoming an FTA-plus arrangement rather than 
following the European model as an economic union. 
The legalization of the AEC, which connects ten diverse developing 
countries, illustrates South–South cooperation in the NREO. The AEC 
framework is built upon ASEAN agreements that govern dispute settlement 
mechanisms, trade in goods, services commitments, and investments. The 
ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) eliminates NTBs and 
incorporates previous goods-related agreements concluded since the 
formation of the AFTA.118 Based on the incremental “package” structure, 
negotiations under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) 
led to multiple packages of services commitments.119 
The mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) and the ASEAN 
Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (ASEAN MNP Agreement) 
 
 112 Id. at 1–37; see also Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Charter Preamble (2007) 
(stressing the respect for “the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, 
consensus and unity in diversity”). 
 113 In contrast with hard law, soft law motivates integration by peer pressure rather than enforcement. 
For four different types of economic integration in preferential trade arrangements, see Cooper, supra 
note 75, at 2. 
 114 See generally SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 16–21; Chia Siow Yue, The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 
11 PAC. REV. no. 2, 213, 213–17 (1998). 
 115 Ganeshan Wignaraja, Regional Trade Agreements and Enterprises in Southeast Asia 4 (ADBI 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 442, 2013). 
 116 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 22. 
Note that in 2015, ASEAN also adopted the ASEAN Blueprint 2025. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, 
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 1.  
 117 See Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations Charter, supra note 112, at art. 3 (“ASEAN, as inter-
governmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality”). 
 118 Kanya Satyani Sasradipoera, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), in ASEAN: LIFE AFTER 
THE CHARTER 89, 90–92 (S. Tiwari ed., 2010). 
 119 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Integration in Services (2013), at 3–13. 
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complement the AFAS by liberalizing the flow of intra-regional skilled 
labor.120 To increase the bloc’s competitiveness to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA) integrates prior agreements, thus streamlining the schedule of 
reservations and according benefits to ASEAN investors.121 ASEAN has also 
developed multilayered dispute settlement mechanisms. Non-economic 
conflicts can be resolved under ASEAN’s first legally binding treaty, the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the subsequent ASEAN 
Charter.122 Trade disputes fall within the realm of the ASEAN Protocol for 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM).123 The TAC and the 
EDSM focus on state-to-state disputes, whereas the ACIA confers private 
investors the right to resort to investor-state arbitration.124 
 B. Regional and Mega FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
Unlike the French–German coordination that contributed to European 
integration, a leadership vacuum caused by the China–Japan rivalry allows 
ASEAN to play an indispensable role in Asia–Pacific regionalism. The 
realist assertion that mutual interests prompt cooperation is demonstrated not 
only in the AEC that legalizes internal integration, but also in ASEAN’s 
external FTAs. Since 2002, ASEAN concluded five ASEAN+1 FTAs with 
China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand.125 The internal and 
external FTAs form an interlocked mechanism, resulting in the FTA-wide de 
facto MFN effect that mutually reinforces trade liberalization. 
The ASEAN framework also validates the premise of the new 
dependency theory to transform the South’s neo-colonial trade relations with 
the North. The AEC and the FTAs with China and India illustrate South–
South cooperation in Third Regionalism. The “North” encompasses intra-
regional developed economies such as Japan and Australia and extra-regional 
 
 120 Id. at 15–17. 
 121 The new agreement integrates the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (1987 Agreement), the 1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area, and 
two related protocols. Yap Lai Peng, The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009: Its 
Objectives, Plan and Progress, in ASEAN: LIFE AFTER THE CHARTER 100, 101 (S. Tiwari ed., 2010). 
 122 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 11–12; Locknie Hsu, The ASEAN Dispute Settlement System, in THE 
ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 380, 383–86 (Sanchita Basu Das et al. eds., 
2013). 
 123 Hsu, supra note 122, at 386–89. 
 124 Id. Note that the 2003 case of Yaung Chi Oo Trading v. Myanmar was the first and only instance 
where ASEAN dealt with legal disputes. The investor-state dispute concerned the interpretation of the 
1987 Agreement and the Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction. Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Gov’t 
of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1. 
 125 ASEAN’s first external FTA was concluded with China in 2002. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, 
ASEAN Economic Community Factbook (2011), at 81–90. 
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powers, including the United States and the EU.126 These developments not 
only repudiate contentions against South–South FTAs, but also support this 
article’s analysis of the NREO. 
Built on the five ASEAN+1 FTAs, the ASEAN-based RCEP will create 
a market that links 16 Asia-Pacific countries.127 The two mega FTAs, the 
RCEP and the TPP, will form pathways to the prospective Free Trade Area 
of the Asia–Pacific (FTAAP), which Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) leaders endorsed.128 The RCEP is expected to increase businesses’ 
FTA utilization by solving the “noodle bowl” syndrome because of the 
complex rules of origin.129 More profoundly, the RCEP will strengthen 
ASEAN’s assertive balance of power strategy that converges the South–
South and North–South FTAs under the notion of ASEAN centrality. 
In essence, both ASEAN’s internal and external FTAs regionalize 
WTO-type special and preferential treatment. A critical feature is permitting 
CLMV countries to have longer transition periods to phase out tariffs and 
NTBs.130 Under the AEC, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) 
proposes to narrow the regional development gap and alleviate poverty by 
providing technical assistance to implement economic integration.131 
Provisions on capacity building of ASEAN+1 FTAs that focus on the least 
developed CLMV countries also complement the IAI.132 In dispute 
settlement provisions, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA specifically 
recognizes SDT.133 If a given dispute involves an ASEAN LDC, other 
 
 126 See Clinton, supra note 26, at 61 (emphasizing US engagement in ASEAN); European 
Commission, supra note 76, at 32 (indicating the negotiations for the EU-ASEAN FTA). 
 127 The 16 countries include ten ASEAN states and six FTA partners. For an analysis of the RCEP, 
see A Powerhouse Merger in RCEP, MBC Research Report, No. 110 at 2–5 (2013), 
http://mbc.com.ph/2013/07/04/mbc-research-report-no-110-august-2013/; Urata, supra note 28, at 6–9. 
 128 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], 2015 Leaders’ Declaration: The 23rd APEC 
Economic Leaders’ Declaration - Building Inclusive Economies, Building a Better World: A Vision for 
an Asia-Pacific Community (2015), sec. 7(b). Currently, four ASEAN members are in both the TPP and 
the RCEP and seven ASEAN states are APEC members. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2017); ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, APEC OUTCOMES & OUTLOOK 2014–2015, 
at 51 (2015). 
 129 See Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism 4 
(ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, Working Paper No. 7, 2007) (referring 
the problem due to “an unorganized tangle of bilateral trade deals”). 
 130 Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV countries) usually have five or more years to 
eliminate tariffs in the AEC and five ASEAN+1 FTAs. Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 
(2009), supra note 116, at 22–23; Urata, supra note 28, at 15. 
 131 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), supra note 116, at 95–106. 
 132 E.g., Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments 
of the Member Countries of the Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the People’s Republic 
of China [ASEAN-China Framework Agreement] (2002), art. 7; Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Ass’n 
of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea (2005), art. 3.2. 
 133 Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (Feb. 27, 2009), art. 
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countries shall give “particular sympathetic consideration.”134 Moreover, the 
arbitral tribunal is obliged to “explicitly indicate” how SDT provisions of the 
FTA have been taken into account.135 
 C. The Services Trade-Oriented Approach to Development 
As argued previously, the NREO moved beyond the SDT-centered 
agenda of the NIEO. What evidences the NREO is not simply the design of 
SDT provisions in ASEAN-based FTAs but also the Grand Bargain 
developing countries have engaged in and the resultant trade-led 
development effect. As of 2015, Southeast Asia exceeded the target of the 
MDGs by halving the population living in extreme poverty.136 Yet, to “[e]nd 
poverty in all its forms” under the SDGs requires a revolutionary strategy to 
assist 30% of ASEAN’s poor still living on less than US$2 a day.137 Against 
this backdrop, I propose a holistic services trade-oriented approach to 
development. These regulatory reform proposals bridge the gap between law 
and practice and will invigorate the trade–development nexus and offer best 
practices for South–South FTAs. 
The Grand Bargain among the ten ASEAN countries has virtually 
achieved the zero-tariff target.138 Compared with trade in goods, liberalizing 
trade in services is far more politically sensitive because the service sector 
involves the inflow of foreign capital and labor. The behind-the-border 
barriers to services trade make the negotiations inherently complex. At the 
global level, the Doha Round standoff has stalled much-needed services trade 
talks. The ongoing plurilateral negotiations of the Trade in Services 
Agreement involve very few developing countries, including none of the 
ASEAN states.139 Before demonstrating ASEAN’s trade liberalization as an 
NREO approach to South–South regionalism, it is important to understand 
the oft-ignored impact of services trade on development and poverty 
 
18, Ch. 17. 
 134 Id. art. 18(1). 
 135 Id. art. 18(2). 
 136 Millennium Development Goals Report (2015), DEP’T OF ECON & SOC. AFFAIRS OF THE U.N. 
SECRETARIAT, at 14 (showing an 84% decrease in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in 
Southeast Asia between 1990 and 2015). 
 137 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goal 1; Report of the ASEAN Regional 
Assessment of MDG Achievement and Post-2015 Development Priorities (2015), THE ASEAN 
SECRETARIAT, at 19. 
 138 The ASEAN Free Trade Area requires ASEAN-6 countries and CLMV countries to eliminate 
tariffs on intra-ASEAN goods by 2010 and 2015, respectively. Masahiro Kawai & Kanda Naknoi, ASEAN 
Economic Integration through Trade and Foreign Direct Investment: Long-Term Challenges, ADBI 
WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 545 (October 2015), at 12; Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-
2015 (2009), supra note 116, at 22–23. 
 139 There are 23 participants in the negotiations. Trade in Services Agreement List of Participants. 
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (last visited Nov. 27, 2015). https://ustr.gov/tisa/participant-
list.  
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reduction. 
First, the reduction of barriers to services trade empirically leads to 
significant GDP gains and stipulates more economic competitiveness than 
mere tariff eliminations.140 Development policies have traditionally centered 
on manufacturing rather than services.141 Contrary to the conventional 
understanding that services should only be prioritized at an advanced 
development stage, services are a prerequisite to inclusive development and 
economic modernization.142 Notably, transport, finance, and internet services 
constitute the backbone of trade in goods. The fact that a 10% increase in 
trade in services results in a 6% growth in trade in goods is evidence of the 
strong correlation between the two major modes of trade.143 
Second, from the global perspective of development, the services trade 
has outgrown agriculture and mining and helped buttress the welfare of the 
poor.144 For example, health services liberalization maximizes the delivery 
of health care to the needy, and tourism services allow up to 25% of tourism 
expenditures to directly reach the poor in LDCs.145 FDIs in developing 
countries are now primarily associated with the service sector and hence 
augment the effect of poverty reduction through job creation.146 Labor 
mobility in services trade results in a financial inflow of remittances and 
helps the poor escape poverty.147 In the case of the Philippines, remittances 
constitute 10% of the GDP and are mostly spent on rural families’ basic needs 
 
 140 Jeffery J. Schott et al., Prospects for Services Trade Negotiations, ADB ECONOMICS WORKINGS 
PAPER SERIES, No. 319 (2012), at 16; Mid-Term Review of the Implementation of AEC Blueprint: 
Executive Summary (2012), ECON. RES. INST. FOR ASEAN & EAST ASIA JAKARTA, at 30. 
 141 ASEAN 2030: Toward a Borderless Economic Community [ASEAN 2030], ASIAN DEV. BANK 
INST. 120 (2014). 
 142 Zakariah Rashid et al., Regional Market for Goods, Services, and Skilled Labor, in REALIZING THE 
ASEAN ECON. CMTY.: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 20, 44 (Michael G. Plummer & Chia Siow Yue 
eds., 2009); ASEAN 2030, supra note 141, at 120. 
 143 JUAN BLYDE & NATALIA SINYAVSKAYA, THE IMPACT OF LIBERALIZING TRADE IN SERVICES ON 
TRADE IN GOODS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION, 11:3 REV. DEV. ECON. 566, 573 (2007). 
 144 ASEAN Integration Monitoring Report 93, ASEAN SECRETARIAT AND THE WORLD BANK (2013); 
Joy Abrenica et al., The Future of Trade in Services for Developing Countries, in TRADE AND POVERTY 
REDUCTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME 
COMMUNITIES 341, 347–48 (Andrew L. Stoler et al. eds., 2009). 
 145 Aaditya Mattoo & Gianni Zanini, Services Trade Agreements and Negotiations: An Overview, in 
HANDBOOK OF TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT 661, 665 (Arvid Lukauskas et al. eds., 2013); Jonathan 
Mitchell, An Unconventional but Essential Marriage: Pro-Poor Tourism and the Mainstream Industry, 
PRIVATE SECTOR & DEV., No. 7 (2010), at 5. 
 146 See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services of Apr. 7, 2010, S/C/W/314, Mode 
3 Commercial Presence,  [Mode 3], at 9 (“[S]ervices accounted for 65 per cent of developing economies’ 
inward FDI stock and for 86 per cent of their outward FDI . . . .”); ASEAN Community 2015: Managing 
Integration for Better Jobs and Shared Prosperity (2014) [ASEAN Community 2015], INT’L LAB. ORG. 
& ASIAN DEV. BANK, at 33 (discussing the significant job creation effect of services sectors in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines). 
 147 IAN GOLDIN & KENNETH REINERT, GLOBALIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT: MEETING NEW 
CHALLENGES 197 (2012). 
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such as food and medical payment.148 The amount of remittances that 
Cambodia receives exceeds 50% of its overseas development aid, further 
evidencing the compelling impact of services trade on development.149 
Finally, trade in services provides new sources of development that help 
countries escape from the “middle-income trap” that often occurs in middle-
income developing countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.150 
These countries rely on their low-cost, labor-intensive advantage as their 
initial development strategy.151 As industrialization and urbanization exhaust 
the pool of unskilled labor and push wage increases to their upper limit, their 
cost competitiveness is eroded and these countries become “stuck” in 
economic stagnation.152 The modernization of the services trade and the 
associated technology transformation are the essential impetus to take these 
countries to an elevated level of development.153 
 IV. THE LEGALIZATION OF TRADE–DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Based on ASEAN’s evolution as a timely case study, this article 
provides the first examination of the realization of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals through regional integration. In Third Regionalism, the 
AEC integration through multilayered FTAs manifests the paradigm shift 
toward the NREO. As realism and the new dependency theories explain, the 
new generation of South–South cooperation expediting trade liberalization 
structurally revamps Southeast Asia’s neo-colonial relationship with 
developed countries. Amid the Doha Round impasse, a regional approach to 
development serves as a feasible “Plan B.” A holistic approach to services 
trade liberalization illustrates the legalization of trade–development policy 
that consolidates services commitments and facilitates labor mobility. The 
roadmap for regulatory reform focuses on integrating development 
assistance, removing trade barriers, harmonizing domestic laws, and 
fortifying human rights protection under the FTA network. An assessment of 
ASEAN’s legal framework and reform proposals in tandem with the SDGs 
 
 148 Building Human Capital through Labor Migration in Asia (2015), ASIAN DEV. BANK INST., INT’L 
LAB. ORG. & OECD, at 14, 37. 
 149 In 2010, Cambodia received US$364 million in remittances and its net overseas development aid 
totaled US$0.7 billion. Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, THE WORLD BANK (2d ed. 2011), at 
84. See also Rupa Chanda, Mobility of Less-Skilled Workers under Bilateral Agreements: Lessons for the 
GATS, 43:3 J. WORLD TRADE 479, 479 (“[R]emittances . . . outweigh official development assistance”). 
 150 Tran Van Tho, The Middle-Income Trap: Issues for Members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, ADBI WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 421 (2013), at 22–29. 
 151 Pierre-Richard Agénor et al., Avoiding Middle-Income Traps, ECO. PREMISE, No. 98 (2012), at 2–
3. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Kenichi Ohno, The Middle Income Trap: Implications for Industrialization Strategies in East Asia 
and Africa, GRIP DEVELOPMENT FORUM (2008), at 93–112; Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China 
and India 2014: Beyond the Middle-Income Trap (2014), OECD, at 20. 
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provides valuable lessons for the Global South to craft pro-development 
services trade and migration policy. 
 A. Integrating and Multilateralizing Services Commitments 
Trade in services is the essential driver of development in ASEAN 
countries.154 The service sector, which accounts for 60% of FDI inflows and 
50% of total employment, has contributed to the bloc’s noteworthy 76% 
surge in the GDP growth in recent years.155 Recognizing the growing 
prominence of the services trade, ASEAN states commenced negotiations 
under the AFAS in 1995.156 The goal is to achieve “a free trade area in 
services” that exceeds the level of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).157 In the context of the SDGs, services trade energizes 
ASEAN’s implementation of poverty reduction, economic growth and 
elimination of the regional inequality.158 This development approach also 
creates employment opportunities for women and promotes gender 
equality.159 
Moreover, to avoid the political backlash that hampers liberalization in 
South–South FTAs, the AFAS adopted a successive package structure. 
Schedules of services commitments concluded under multiple rounds of 
negotiations cumulatively “form an integral part of” the AFAS.160 Due to the 
AFAS’s non-self-executing nature, each state is required to sign the protocol 
that embodies specific commitments.161 Each package of commitments will 
not take effect until the completion of domestic ratification procedures.162 
The AFAS’ incremental approach eases domestic protectionism and 
facilitates domestic reforms. In addition to the ten packages of services 
commitments (AFAS 1-10), ASEAN concluded separate packages of 
financial services and air transport services.163 The AFAS incorporates these 
 
 154 See generally Asian Development Outlook 2015: Financing Asia’s Future Growth (2015), ASIAN 
DEV. BANK, at 209–47. 
 155 ASEAN Services Integration Report (2015), THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT & THE WORLD BANK, at 
i–ii; A Blueprint for Growth – ASEAN Economic Community 2015: Progress and Key Achievements 
(2015), THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT, at 1. 
 156 ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT, at 27. 
 157 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (1995) [AFAS], art. I(c). 
 158 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goals 1, 8 and 10. 
 159 Id. Goal 5; JIM REDDEN, Introduction, TRADE AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
REGION: CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 1, 13 (Andrew L. Stoler et al. 
eds., 2009). 
 160 Id. art. VIII. 
 161 E.g., ASEAN, Protocol to Implement the Ninth Package of Commitments under the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (2014), arts. 4–5. 
 162 Id. 
 163 As of November 2015, nine packages of AFAS commitments have been concluded. While ASEAN 
economic ministers negotiated and signed the packages of the general AFAS commitments, the 
liberalization of financial services and air transport services was carried out by finance and transport 
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general and sector-specific services commitments and thus constitutes the 
AEC’s foundation of a single market and production base. 
Modeled after the GATS, the AFAS covers four modes of the services 
trade: Mode 1 (cross-border supply), Mode 2 (consumption abroad), Mode 3 
(commercial presence), and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons or 
MNP).164 WTO members’ Modes 3 and 4 commitments are subject to the 
most restrictions.165 ASEAN countries’ liberalization of these modes under 
the AFAS demonstrates the developing countries’ Grand Bargain in South-
based regionalism. Given the importance of increasing the free flow of intra-
regional professionals, the ASEAN MNP agreement will supersede Mode 4 
commitments under the existing AFAS packages.166 The MRAs will further 
promote the movement of skilled labor by facilitating the recognition of 
qualifications for eight professions.167 More importantly, ASEAN expects to 
adopt the single undertaking approach to negotiate the comprehensive 
ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement (ATISA), which will consolidate 
various forms of services commitments.168 
The evolution of services negotiation modalities for the AEC provides 
legal and policy options for the NREO approach to development. AFAS 
negotiations initially followed a more conservative GATS-like positive list 
formula, which limits liberalization to scheduled sectors.169 The request-and-
offer bargain obliged ASEAN states to list the sectors and modes of supply 
that they wished to liberalize in binding schedules. Liberalization efforts 
were expedited by endorsing a common sub-sector approach, which denoted 
a sub-sector in which three or four ASEAN states made commitments under 
the GATS or previous AFAS packages.170 The concessions in the sub-sector 
had to be multilateralized to all ASEAN countries. In other words, those 
 
ministers, respectively. ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), supra note 156, at xix, 29; ASEAN 
Integration in Services (2013), supra note 119, at 13–14. 
 164 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATT 1994), art. I:2. 
 165 Mode 3, supra note 146, at 17; World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services of Sept. 
15, 2009, S/C/W/301, Mode 4 Presence of Natural Persons [hereinafter Presence of Natural Persons 
(Mode 4)], at 20–25. 
 166 ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (2012) [ASEAN MNP Agreement], art. 
6:2. 
 167 ASEAN Integration Report 2015, 33–34 (Nov. 20, 2015), http://asean.org/storage/2015/12/ 
ASEAN-Integration-Report-2015.pdf.  
 168 Joint Media Statement, The 46th ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting, 5 (Aug. 25, 
2014), http://asean.org/storage/2016/08/00-AEM-48-JMS-FINAL.pdf. This approach follows the model 
of the 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA). STEFANO INAMA & EDMUND W. SIM, THE 
FOUNDATION OF THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PROFILE 127 
(2015); ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, 6 (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/AEC-Blueprint-2025-FINAL.pdf. 
 169 This approach resulted in the first two packages of AFAS commitments (AFAS 1-2). ASEAN 
Integration in Services, 10 (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2013/ 
resources/publication/2013%20(9.%20Sep)%20-%20ASEAN%20Integration%20in%20Services.pdf. 
 170 AFAS 3–6 followed the common sub-sector approach. Id. 
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countries that made no corresponding commitments could be free riders. 
To effectuate the Grand Bargain that would result in pro-development 
trade liberalization, ASEAN implemented the ASEAN Minus X modality in 
2003.171 Two or more states could initiate negotiations and liberalize selected 
sectors, permitting other states to join subsequently.172 Different from the 
common sub-sector approach, the concessions would only be granted on a 
reciprocal basis so that the free rider problem could be eliminated. Thus, 
ASEAN integration would not be dragged down to the pace of countries that 
were unwilling to cooperate and the benefits of liberalization could 
incentivize these states to make further commitments.173 
The year 2007 marked the adoption of the AEC Blueprint 2015, a 
revolutionary change that envisioned a single market and production base by 
the end of 2015.174 The Blueprint mandated salient reforms to eliminate 
“substantially all restrictions on trade in services.”175 The less sensitive 
Modes 1 and 2 were expected to be completely liberalized.176 Significantly, 
the AEC is not modeled after the EU due to the limited liberalization scope 
of Modes 3 and 4, which face strong domestic protectionism. The 
compromise on Mode 3 permits 70% rather than 100% of ASEAN equity 
participation.177 Mode 4 concerns the increase of competition from foreign 
nationals. The AEC framework is confined to the free flow of skilled labor 
to the exclusion of low-skilled and unskilled labor.178 Furthermore, the 
ASEAN Minus X formula continues to apply, and a 15% overall flexibility 
enables member states to carve out sensitive services industries from 
commitments.179 
These designs have formed a balance between the regulatory 
sovereignty and the regional integration under South–South FTAs. Since 
1995, successive AFAS packages of commitments have transformed from 
 
 171 Based on the Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (2003), Article 
IV bis (ASEAN Minus X modality) was added to the AFAS. This modality can be traced back to the 
Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (2012). SEVERINO, supra note 111, 
at 352. 
 172 Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation art. I:3. 
 173 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 352–53. 
 174 The AEC Blueprint has governed the negotiations of AFAS 7 and subsequent packages of 
commitments. ASEAN Integration in Services, supra note 169, at 19; Deunden Nikomborirak & 
Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, An Assessment of Services Sector Liberalization in ASEAN, in ASEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 47, 48 (Sanchita Basu Das ed., 
2013). 
 175 For the actions of the AEC Blueprint, refer to Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015, 
26 (Apr., 2009), http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/2_Roadmap_for_ASEAN_ 
Community_20092015.pdf. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 29–30. 
 179 Id. at 26, n.2. 
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marginally to substantially GATS-plus.180 The level of services liberalization 
under ASEAN’s internal FTAs mutually reinforces the liberalization under 
the region-based external FTAs. The interlocked mechanism secures the 
certainty of domestic reform and energizes deeper liberalization based on the 
threshold of the most recently concluded or updated commitments. Critically, 
the implicit mechanism consolidates South–South cooperation and 
revitalizes North–South relations in line with development goals. 
The sequential approach also facilitates the extra-regionalization of 
ASEAN-centered regionalism that buttresses the bloc’s balance of power 
policy. With the exception of the single undertaking approach of the 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, other ASEAN+1 FTAs allow 
essential components of FTAs to be separately concluded under a framework 
agreement.181 The model was based on the significant South–South trade 
pact, the ASEAN–China FTA, which was built upon agreements on goods, 
services, investment, and the dispute settlement mechanism.182 This FTA, 
which took eight years to complete, is critical to Beijing’s “One Belt One 
Road” initiative and ASEAN’s development target to attract FDI inflows.183 
With respect to services commitments, ASEAN FTAs with China and 
Korea adopted the AFAS-like package structure.184 While the first package 
under the ASEAN–China FTA contained rare “GATS-minus” commitments, 
the subsequent package remedied the situation by elevating the commitments 
to GATS-plus.185 ASEAN’s most recent breakthrough was the conclusion of 
a services agreement with India, which has been ultraconservative about 
service liberalization.186 The fact that the liberalization level of the AFAS 
surpasses that of ASEAN+1 FTAs ensures the AEC’s integration and 
provides an impetus for RCEP and FTAAP liberalization.187 In turn, the 
 
 180 David Chin Soon Siong, ASEAN’s Journey Towards Free Trade, in ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: 
ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS BY SINGAPORE’S NEGOTIATORS 209, 215 (C. L. Lim & Margaret Liang eds., 
2010); ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 167, at 29–30. 
 181 ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 167, at 95–102. 
 182 ASEAN Economic Community Factbook, 81–82 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.asean.org/wp-
content/uploads/images/2012/publications/ASEAN%20Economic%20Community%20Factbook.pdf. 
 183 The ASEAN-China FTA began in 2002 and was finalized in 2010. Id.; ASEAN Integration Report 
2015, supra note 167, at 96; China to Align Belt and Road with ASEAN’s Development Strategies, XINHUA 
NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 6, 2015, http://english.gov.cn/news/international_exchanges/2015/08/06/ 
content_281475162278714.htm.  
 184 Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Hikari Ishido, Assessing the Progress of Services Liberalization in the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), ERIA DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (2013), at 14. 
 185 See id. at 3–15 (explaining the rationale for General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)-
minus commitments and the comparison between two packages). 
 186 Agreement on Trade in Services under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India (Nov. 13, 
2014), http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/pdf/2014_upload/reducedASEAN-India%20Trade 
%20in%20Services%20Agreement%20-%20Scanned%20ASEAN%20version%20copy.pdf. 
 187 For the FTAs’ various levels of services liberalization, see Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 184, at 
7; Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Ikumo Isono, Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A Mapping Study, 
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economic growth led by services trade will revitalize developing countries’ 
external trade relations and reinforce the regional development objectives of 
the SDGs. 
 B. Accelerating Cross-Border Labor Mobility 
Transnational labor mobility in services trade is a paramount 
development tool. Going beyond the poverty reduction effect of remittances, 
circular migration brings back skills and experiences that benefit the 
economic development of the original countries.188 Nonetheless, allowing the 
entry of foreign nationals is among the most sensitive issues in international 
economic law because it is often perceived as opening the backdoor for 
immigration. Not surprisingly, the WTO and FTA commitments to the 
temporary movement of natural persons (Mode 4) are far more restrictive 
than other modes of supply.189 For instance, in the face of congressional 
objections, the United States’ FTA policy turned conservative about Mode 4 
commitments subsequent to the FTAs with Chile and Singapore.190 Similarly, 
the TPP provisions on the temporary entry of business persons are expected 
to be contested in U.S. Congress and other parliaments at the ratification 
stage.191 
For these reasons, ASEAN’s labor mobility exemplifies an NREO 
approach to cement the trade–development nexus through the liberalization 
of Mode 4 and benefit the SDG target of “full and productive 
employment.”192 Distinct from the EU’s freedom of movement, the AEC 
confines the free flow of labor to skilled workers in order to reconcile 
political resistance with economic integration.193 From a regional 
development perspective, the Mode 4 progress eases the shortage of 
 
ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2013), at 16. 
 188 Simon Feeny & Mark McGillivray, The Role of ASEAN Connectivity in Reducing the Development 
Gap, in NARROWING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP IN ASEAN: DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS 84, 113 (Mark 
McGillivray & David Carpenter eds., 2013); Graeme Hugo, What we Know About Circular Migration 
and Enhanced Mobility, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/what-we-know-about-circular-migration-and-enhanced-
mobility. 
 189 WTO Secretariat, GATS, Mode 4 and the Pattern of Commitments: Background Information, 3 
(Apr. 11–12, 2002); Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 25. 
 190 Sherry Stephenson & Gary Hufbauer, Labor Mobility, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT 
POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 275, 281–83 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe 
Maur eds., 2011). 
 191 See generally The Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), supra note 128, at Ch. 12. 
 192 United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 8 
(2015), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/brochure/SDGs_Booklet_Web_ 
En.pdf. 
 193 The EU concept of freedom of movement, see the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (2012), art. 45, 2012 O.J. (C 326/49). 
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professionals in more developed ASEAN countries.194 In addition, the 
liberalization will narrow the bloc’s development gap by allowing skilled 
workers in CLMV countries to increase their income by 14–20%.195 
Recognizing these pro-development benefits, ASEAN enacted treaties 
that underpin the AEC’s Mode 4 framework, which includes the ASEAN 
MNP Agreement and MRAs. Mode 3 obligations of commercial presence 
under the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement also complement 
Mode 4 liberalization. To facilitate ASEAN enterprises’ regional operation, 
the ACIA authorizes the entry, temporary stay, and work of “investors, 
executives, managers and members of the board of directors” in member 
states.196 
Pursuant to the AEC Blueprint, the ASEAN MNP Agreement, which 
will supersede AFAS Mode 4 commitments, applies to skilled labor rather 
than all “natural persons.”197 It accelerates the movement of intra-corporate 
transferees, business visitors, contractual service suppliers, and other 
professionals as defined in states’ schedules of commitments.198 Essentially, 
the agreement extends only to the service sector.199 For example, an intra-
regional transfer of a Singapore-based sales manager of an agricultural or 
manufacturing plant in Myanmar falls outside the scope of the agreement, as 
neither agriculture nor manufacturing belongs to the service sector. 
Nonetheless, the Singapore manager’s entry to other ASEAN countries for 
business trips is guaranteed under the ACIA, which covers “services 
incidental to” the non-service sectors.200 
Akin to the GATS, the ASEAN MNP Agreement covers services 
provision on a non-permanent basis, so that intra-regional labor mobility will 
not become a political immigration issue that impedes the development of 
South–South FTAs. The agreement facilitates the “temporary” entry or stay 
of service providers.201 Because of the ambiguity as to what length of time 
 
 194 For example, Brunei and Thailand have faced a shortage of skilled labor in certain sectors. Philip 
Martin & Manolo Abella, Reaping the Economic and Social Benefits of Labour Mobility: ASEAN 2015, 
ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series (2014), at 33; Labor Migration, Skills & Student Mobility in Asia, 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK INSTITUTE (2014), at 31. 
 195 ASEAN Community 2015, supra note 146, at 72. 
 196 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement [ACIA] art. 22 (2009), http://www.asean.org/ 
storage/images/2013/economic/aia/ACIA_Final_Text_26%20Feb%202009.pdf. The preferential 
treatment under the ASEAN MNP Agreement applies to these key positions identified in the ACIA. 
ASEAN MNP Agreement, supra note 166, at art. 12:2. 
 197 ASEAN MNP Agreement preamble, supra note 166. 
 198 Id. art. 2:1. Intra-corporate transferees include executives, managers and specialists employed by 
companies. 
 199 The Agreement stipulates that it covers persons engaged in trade in services, goods and 
investments, but none of the ASEAN countries made commitments in non-services sectors. Id. preamble 
& art. 1(b); Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Hirari Ishido, Values and Limitations of the ASEAN Agreement on 
the Movement of Natural Persons, ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2015), at 5. 
 200 ACIA, supra note 196, at art. 3:3(f). 
 201 ASEAN MNP Agreement, supra note 166, at art. 3:3(f). 
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“temporary” entails, the commitments of ASEAN states vary largely across 
different categories of natural persons.202 The agreement explicitly excludes 
the governments’ “measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the 
employment market” and “measures regarding citizenship, residence or 
employment on a permanent basis.”203 ASEAN states are therefore allowed 
to maintain visa requirements for public purposes, provided that the benefits 
under the agreement are not nullified or impaired.204 The potential for skilled 
worker migration within ASEAN is arguably undermined because the 
agreement does not authorize the permanent entry of professionals.205 
In addition to the Mode 4 commitments under the ASEAN MNP 
Agreement, ASEAN’s MRAs facilitate the recognition of qualifications and 
advance intra-regional labor mobility. As MRAs require significant changes 
in domestic rules allowing for foreign talents, they are outside of the WTO 
framework and are rarely addressed in FTAs.206 ASEAN’s “à la carte” 
approach to profession-specific harmonization efforts signifies the 
implementation of regional law through a horizontal soft-law approach. 
Unlike what the titles may suggest, MRAs do not accord direct recognition 
of licenses and certifications.207 Instead, they provide a scheme of 
cooperation based on member states’ respective agreements that harmonize 
the divergence of national legislation regulating various professions.208 
The effectiveness of MRAs is critical to ASEAN’s single market and its 
attractiveness for global professional firms. Although the AEC Blueprint 
2015 mandates that MRAs for all professional services be finalized by 2015, 
ASEAN has so far concluded MRAs for only eight professions.209 The MRA 
“frameworks” on accountancy services and surveying services focus on 
identifying major principles and facilitating information exchanges.210 Their 
purpose is to build consensus for fully fledged MRAs that govern highly 
regulated professions in diverse jurisdictions. For the other six professions, 
the implementation approaches vary across MRAs. The MRAs on nursing 
 
 202 The term “temporary” is negatively defined in the Agreement, based the model of the GATS Annex 
on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services. See also Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190, 
at 276 (discussing the GATS approach).  
 203 ASEAN MNP Agreement, supra note 166, at art. 2:2. 
 204 Id. at art 2:3. 
 205 ASEAN 2030, supra note 141, at 163. 
 206 GATS only include loose requirements for mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) in Article 
VII. 
 207 Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), at 20–21. 
 208 AFAS, supra note 157, at art. V. 
 209 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26; 
ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 156, at 33. 
 210 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement Framework on 
Accountancy Services (2009), art. 1; Chia Siow Yue, Free Flow of Skilled Labour in ASEAN, in ASEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 107, 118–19 (Sanchita Basu Das 
ed., 2013). 
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services, medical practitioners, and dental practitioners require a relatively 
simple process. Following certification by his or her country of origin, a 
medical doctor with sufficient qualification and without ethics violations 
may register as a foreign medical practitioner in the host country.211 
As “the most visible” MRAs, the agreements on engineering services 
and architectural services created regional bodies.212 Under the regional 
public–private partnership, the ASEAN-level professional institutions and 
national regulatory bodies have established a three-step registration process. 
For example, an engineer who meets the MRA’s educational and experience 
requirements should be first certified by the domestic regulatory body, which 
submits the application to the ASEAN committee.213 After approval as an 
“ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer,” the engineer is eligible to apply 
to be a foreign engineer in another ASEAN state.214 
The most recent MRA on tourism professionals (MRA-TP) has 
important implications for development because tourism services are closely 
linked with GDP and employment in developing countries.215 Unique among 
ASEAN MRAs, the MRA-TP governs “unregulated” professions because no 
international standards exist for tourism services providers.216 The ASEAN 
experience sheds light on the impact of the legalization of tourism 
professionals. The MRA-TP will advance the regional tourism industry by 
developing a common curriculum and competency standards for thirty-two 
job titles, such as baker, laundry manager, and travel consultant.217 It will 
 
 211 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on 
Medical Practitioners (2009), art. 3.1. 
 212 ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 156, at 34. The MRAs on engineering services and 
architectural services created the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer Coordinating Committee and 
the ASEAN Architecture Council, respectively. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN MRA on 
Engineering Services (2005), art. 3.1; Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement on Architectural Services (2007), art. 3.1. 
 213 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Engineering Services (2005), art. 3. 
 214 Id.; Deunden Nikomborirak & Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, ASEAN Trade in Services, in THE 
ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 95, 104–05 (Sanchita Basu Das ed., 2013). As 
of 2015, there are 1,252 engineers and 284 architects on the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineers 
Register and ASEN Architect Register, respectively. ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 156, at 
34. 
 215 The revenues for the tourism sector contribute to 10% of Cambodia’s GDP and 10% of 
employment in the Philippines. Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, Cambodia, Revision, 
WT/TPR/S/253/Rev.1, Nov. 24, 2011, at 79; Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, the 
Philippines, Revision, WT/TPR/S/261/Rev.2, May 9, 2012, at 93. 
 216 Note that in some ASEAN countries, tour guides are subject to regulatory requirements and 
therefore they are not covered under the MRA. Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Assessing the Progress of ASEAM 
MRAs on Professional Services, ERIA DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (2015), at 26. 
 217 A person who possesses a tourism certificate issued by a national agency in compliance with MRA 
requirements can be recognized as a “Foreign Tourism Professional” in another ASEAN state. Ass’n of 
Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Tourism Professionals, 
arts. II-III; ASEAN MUTUAL RECOGNITION ARRANGEMENT ON TOURISM PROFESSIONALS (MRA) – 
HANDBOOK (2013) [hereinafter MRA-TP Handbook], at 18. 
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also create a Web-based database to assist registered tourism professionals 
in seeking employment in the bloc.218 
 C. Regulatory Reform for the Post-2015 Agenda 
The emergence of the NREO in the context of Third Regionalism 
demonstrates how the rise of South–South FTAs deepens regional 
cooperation. Having grasped the reality that the benefits of bargained 
concessions outweigh those of SDT measures, developing countries in the 
Asia–Pacific have switched to a neo-liberal approach to international 
economic law. South-based regionalism provides these countries with a safe 
“playing ground” for trade liberalization. Moreover, the Doha Development 
Agenda stresses aid for trade to help LDCs.219 The Bali package offers LDCs 
additional waivers and preferential market access as a pro-development 
policy.220 Ironically, these measures rarely necessitate domestic reform that 
energizes development. The NREO approach provides a different path. 
ASEAN-based regionalism has incentivized CLMV countries to pursue 
market reform that resulted in noteworthy growth. As part of the bloc, these 
LDCs benefit from the augmented negotiating power in extra-regional FTAs. 
The AEC integration also prevents the negative consequence of trade 
diversion.221 
Built on the original AEC Blueprint, the creation of the AEC in 2015 
prompted the adoption of the AEC Blueprint 2025 with the goal of further 
transforming the bloc to a unified economy that is “highly integrated and 
cohesive” and focuses on “sustainable economic development.”222 In 
particular, services liberalization indicates ASEAN’s legalization of trade–
development policy in line with the SDGs. Nevertheless, it should be 
cautioned that the AEC should be seen as an impetus for the evolving 
process. To buttress the NREO argument for the benefits of the Global South, 
I offer the following regulatory reform proposals in ASEAN’s post-2015 
agenda. 
 1. Operationalizing Development Assistance 
Operationalizing ASEAN’s development assistance is integral to the 
services trade-oriented development policy and provides a model for South-
centered regionalism. The two-tiered ASEAN problem due to member states’ 
 
 218 MRA-TP Handbook at 45–46. 
 219 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WTO AT TWENTY: CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
(2015), at 32–33. 
 220 Id. 
 221 See Cooper, supra note 75, at 11 (explaining the economic impact of the FTAs). 
 222 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 
(2015), at 3, 19. 
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economic divergences has posed formidable obstacles to the AEC’s goal of 
realizing a single market and production base. As a form of development 
assistance, the IAI work plans are intertwined with narrowing the 
development gap and poverty reduction efforts.223 For instance, Singapore 
offers training on IT and tourism through its centers in CLMV countries and 
promotes the liberalization of these LDCs’ trade in services.224 However, the 
effectiveness of fragmented IAI programs has been questionable.225 
To offer WTO-plus development assistance, it is imperative to 
consolidate multilateral harmonization and cooperation according to the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.226 Decreasing the transaction costs 
of IAI programs and providing need-based advisory assistance will 
strengthen the services trade-oriented strategy. An important approach is to 
incorporate the principle of ASEAN centrality by aligning development aids 
rendered by intra-regional and extra-regional countries. The integrated 
measures will in turn achieve the SDGs’ objective of revitalizing global 
partnership by fortifying “North-South, South-South and triangular 
cooperation.”227 
In truth, geopolitical considerations underpin respective countries’ 
official development assistance (ODA) policies, which are linked to the 
implementation of FTAs and IAI efforts. Chinese foreign assistance enforces 
Xi Jinping’s diplomatic priority over the periphery countries as an approach 
to increase Beijing’s bargaining power to formulate the “new type of major 
power relations” with Washington.228 The Chinese characteristics of South–
South cooperation have traditionally emphasized concessional loans for 
 
 223 ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 156, at 80–81; Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 
2009-2015 (2009), at 96–106. 
 224 David Carpenter et al., Regional Development Cooperation and Narrowing the Development Gap 
in ASEAN, in NARROWING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP IN ASEAN: DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS 135, 166 
(Mark McGillivray & David Carpenter eds., 2013); About Us, SING. COOPERATION PROGRAMME, 
https://www.scp.gov.sg/content/scp/about_us.html#what_we_do (last visited Aug. 13, 2017). Under the 
Initiative for AESAN Integration (IAI), Singapore is the largest donor among ASEAN-6 countries. Id. at 
164–65. Also note that IAI work plans focus primarily on soft infrastructure. Ass’n of Southeast Asian 
Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Economic Community Factbook (2011), at 78. 
 225 Helen E.S. Nesadurai, Enhancing the Institutional Framework for AEC Implementation: 
Designing Institutions that Are Effective and Politically Feasible, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 411, 421 (Sanchita Basu Das et al. eds., 2013); Vo Tri Thanh, 
ASEAN Economic Community: Perspective from ASEAN’s Transitional Economies, in ROADMAP TO AN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 105, 116 (Denis Hew ed., 2005). 
 226 See GOLDIN & REINERT, supra note 147, 124 (indicating the Paris Declaration principles as 
“ownership, harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability”). 
 227 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goal 17.6. 
 228 Timothy Heath, China’s Big Diplomacy Shift, DIPLOMAT, (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/chinas-big-diplomacy-shift/; Dingding Chen, Defining a “New Type of 
Major Power Relations,” DIPLOMAT, (Dec. 8, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-
type-of-major-power-relations/.  
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infrastructure building to facilitate the export of Chinese capital and labor.229 
The private equity fund created under the ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
exemplify the practice.230 
The training of foreign officials in China also demonstrates a new trend 
of “soft” development assistance to export the Chinese development 
model.231 Moreover, as the ASEAN–China FTA indicates, the geographic 
hub of Chinese aid is the Mekong River basin, which covers CLMV countries 
that are ideologically akin to China.232 The Chinese economic influence over 
Cambodia is most noteworthy, as it prompted Phnom Penh to side with 
Beijing in conflict with ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea 
disputes.233 
Similar to China’s focus on Southeast Asia, the Abe Doctrine of Japan 
drove the country to be the largest external donor to the IAI programs.234 
Whereas the Fukuda Doctrine built the foundation of ASEAN–Japan 
relations in the 1970s, the Abe administration considers its ODA from the 
national security viewpoint.235 The purpose of Tokyo’s assertive strategy is 
to provide a counter balance to China and strengthen the United States–Japan 
alliance, as well as consolidate Japanese enterprises’ regional supply chains. 
The ASEAN–Japan FTA encompasses areas of economic cooperation in 
terms of business environment, intellectual property, and small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs).236 Japan’s innovative development initiative 
includes the technical assistance of drafting Myanmar’s Securities Exchange 
Law, which facilitates the entrance of Japanese enterprises and law firms into 
emerging markets.237 
 
 229 Information Office of the State Council of China, White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, at 2–8, 
(July 10, 2014). 
 230 China’s Foreign Assistance in Review: Implications for the United States, U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission Research Backgrounder (2011), at 13; Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank Articles of Agreement (2015), arts. 1–2.  
 231 Information Office of the State Council of China, White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, at 4–5, 
(July 10, 2014). 
 232 ASEAN-China Framework Agreement, supra note 132, art 7:1(e). 
 233 Cambodia’s pro-Beijing policy has impaired the common position of ASEAN on South China Sea 
disputes. Kong Sothanarith, Cambodia Publicly Endorses China Position on South China Sea, VOICE OF 
AM. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/content/cambodia-publicly-endorses-china-position-on-
south-china-sea/2694301.html.  
 234 Carpenter, supra note 224, at 160–64; Narushige Michishita, Shinzo Abe: Abe Doctrine to Remake 
Japan-Asean Relations, STRAIT TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/shinzo-abe-abe-
doctrine-to-remake-japan-asean-relations.  
 235 For the origin and core principles of the Fukuda Doctrine, see SUEO SUDO, JAPAN’S ASEAN 
POLICY: IN SEARCH OF PROACTIVE MULTILATERALISM 69–75 (2015). 
 236 Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations 
[ASEAN]–Japan, Apr. 18, 2008, art. 53. 
 237 NAM PAN, JAPANESE ODA TO ASIAN COUNTRIES: “AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MYANMAR 
COMPARED WITH CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND VIETNAM,” 38 (2014). 
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The conventional “North” also provides noteworthy development 
assistance. Obama’s “pivot to Asia” policy and anti-terrorism strategy form 
the basis of the ASEAN–United States Strategic Partnership, which 
strengthens U.S. aid in trade facilitation, investment, and SMEs.238 To 
expand ties with Asia, the EU also implements programs to enhance 
ASEAN’s FTA negotiation capacity and the operations of the ASEAN 
Secretariat.239 The United States and the EU are ASEAN’s dialogue partners, 
but they have yet to conclude region-based FTAs with ASEAN.240 Among 
ASEAN’s external FTAs, the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA has the 
most detailed economic cooperation mechanism that directly contributes to 
ASEAN’s integrated services market. Under the auspices of the FTA, the 
ASEAN Qualifications Referencing Framework, which harmonizes legal 
differences, advances the bloc’s Mode 4 liberalization and MRAs.241 
Multilateral development assistance associated with the changing nature 
of North–South relations benefits ASEAN in the multipolar economic 
structure and affirms the NREO assumptions based on realism and the new 
dependency theory. Nevertheless, countries’ “unilateral adoption” of IAI 
projects, galvanized by divergent geopolitical goals, runs the risk of 
undermining ASEAN’s integration and the IAI’s effectiveness. In practice, 
leaders of projects from donor countries have conducted only informal 
meetings for information exchange without substantive coordination to 
reduce overlapping programs.242 
To implement the Paris Declaration principles, ASEAN should 
formalize development assistance coordination under the FTA framework. 
Some may contend that the development chapter of the TPP will fill the gap 
of coordination. I disagree with this contention. Although more ASEAN 
countries are considering joining the TPP, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar 
are unlikely to join the pact due to its high standards.243 The danger of being 
“left out” for these LDC countries is counteractive to the AEC’s objective to 
 
 238 See generally The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. 
Strategic Partnership (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/21/ 
joint-statement-asean-us-strategic-partnership; Activity Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Connectivity through 
Trade and Investment (ACTI) (2015). 
 239 EU-ASEAN: NATURAL PARTNERS, at 7–8 (7th ed. 2013); Carpenter, supra note 224, at 160–
62. 
 240 ASEAN’s dialogue partners include non-FTA partners such as the United States, Russia and the 
EU. ASEAN Dialogue Coordinatorship, http://asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-dialogue-
coordinatorship/. 
 241 Implementing Arrangement for the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Economic Co-
Operation Work Programme Pursuant to Chapter 12 (Economic Co-Operation) of the Agreement 
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, ASEAN-Austl.-N.Z., Feb. 27, 2009. 
 242 EVALUATION OF EC CO-OPERATION WITH ASEAN, vol. 2, at 96–97 (2009).  
 243 As of December 2015, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand indicated their intentions to join 
the TPP. Prashanth Parameswaran, Indonesia Wants to Join TPP: President Jokowi, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 27, 
2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/indonesia-wants-to-join-tpp-jokowi/.  
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narrow the development gap. 
Importantly, the development needs of developing countries in the TPP, 
such as Chile, Mexico, and Peru, are different from those of ASEAN. The 
TPP may have a negative “development assistance diversion” effect on the 
ASEAN states. Under Article 23, the TPP expects to establish a Committee 
of Development to implement assistance programs.244 While such an FTA 
design should be acknowledged, the TPP Committee lacks the institutional 
memory concerning ASEAN IAI projects. Also, the TPP provisions address 
neither a monitoring mechanism nor resource mobilization, which relates to 
the fundamental question of “where money comes from.” The additional 
ODA budget may further delay the ratification of the TPP in developed 
countries. 
The proposed NREO approach to development assistance is 
distinguishable from the NIEO, which demanded overall redistributive 
justice in international economic law without taking the North–South 
political reality into account. The NREO proposes to translate fragmented, 
geopolitical, interest-motivated development assistance projects into an 
integrated, law-based mechanism centered on the South. To operationalize 
development provisions under the mandate of the ASEAN Blueprint 2025, 
effective coordination of development assistance should be integrated into 
the implementation of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the prospective RCEP.245 It is 
for the ASEAN Secretariat to formalize the consultative mechanism between 
ASEAN states and foreign donor countries. 
To accurately address the needs of CLMV countries, the Secretariat is 
advised to enforce monitoring and evaluation of development assistance 
projects.246 Based on lessons learned from the WTO Enhanced Integrated 
Framework for Aid for Trade, a trust fund coming from the existing budget 
of ASEAN partners can be created.247 The fund would ensure the 
independence of projects and enhance the ASEAN Secretariat’s capacity to 
mobilize resources by aligning IAI work plans with AEC goals and the 
SDGs. These mechanisms would provide a new catalyst for operationalizing 
development assistance under the FTA architecture. 
 
 244 The Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 128, art. 23.7. 
 245 The scope of my proposal is larger than that of proposal for the Initiative for East Asian Integration. 
Vo Tri Thanh, Effectiveness of Initiative for ASEAN Integration, in ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 183, 200 (Sanchita Basu Das ed. 2013); ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint 2025, at 34-25 (2015). 
 246 FTA provisions should transform current ASEAN guidelines that “encourage” monitoring and 
evaluation to a binding nature. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] GUIDELINES FOR IAI 
PROJECTS: FOR ASEAN DIALOGUE PARTNERS AND EXTERNAL PARTIES, at Sec. III (2013); ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint 2025, at 37 (2015). 
 247 For the introduction to the WTO Enhanced Integrated Framework and its predecessor, the 
Integrated Framework, see WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WTO AT TWENTY: CHALLENGES AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS (2015), at 74. 
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 2. Removing Regulatory Trade Barriers 
Effective development assistance will positively impact services trade-
oriented development and benefit the SDGs to end poverty, promote 
economic growth and employment, and reduce the inequality among 
nations.248 Nonetheless, a prerequisite to this projection is regionalism-
promoted reform that removes regulatory trade barriers in domestic law. In 
other words, services commitments under FTAs work for development if 
they are based on de jure and de facto implementation. To provide a model 
for South–South FTAs, ASEAN states should undergo further reform on the 
negotiation modality and domestic regulations. 
The structural improvements to ASEAN’s liberalization of trade in 
services need to be prioritized in its post-2015 agenda. First, the immediate 
priority is to enact the ATISA, which consolidates various services 
commitments in general AFAS packages, sector-specific packages, and the 
ASEAN MNP Agreement.249 The incremental liberalization approach is at 
the point where a single schedule of commitments would further 
transparency and integration. The ATISA should also strengthen its linkage 
with the ACIA’s Mode 3 commitments to prevent Mode 4 restrictions from 
obstructing the commercial presence of ASEAN enterprises.250 
Second, AFAS commitments have been negotiated under the positive 
list modality. Switching the negotiation mode to the more aggressive 
negative list approach would effectively cover newly developed services and 
enhance transparency.251 This approach would also solidify intra-ASEAN 
supply chains and avoid the TPP’s potential trade diversion effect, which 
would undermine the AEC integration. Except for Singapore’s hybrid 
approach to services commitments, ASEAN countries are in favor of the 
positive list approach to retain their regulatory space to protect infant 
industries.252 However, an inventive design is embedded in the Malaysia–
New Zealand FTA, which currently lists services commitments on a positive 
 
 248 See Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goals 1, 8, & 10. 
 249 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, at 6 (2015). 
 250 See Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 31 (explaining the risk of disconnections between 
Modes 3 and 4 in ASEAN services commitments). 
 251 Christopher Findlay, Services Trade Liberalization in ASEAN, in ROADMAP TO AN ASEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 172, 186–87 (Denis Hew 2005); Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvé, Services, in 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK, 235, 251–52 (Jean-
Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds., 2011). 
 252 For example, Singapore followed the positive list approach in the Singapore-China FTA, but 
adopted the negative list approach in the Singapore-Peru FTA. Trade Policy Review: Singapore, Report 
by the Secretariat, Revision, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/267/Rev.1 (Oct. 18, 2012), at 56. Other ASEAN 
states, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, scheduled their services commitments under FTAs predominantly 
on a positive list basis. Trade Policy Review: Malaysia, Report by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. 
WT/TPR/S/292 (Jan. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Trade Policy Review, Malaysia], at 104; Trade Policy 
Review: Indonesia, Report by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/278 (Mar. 6, 2013), at 84, 109–10. 
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list basis.253 In the FTA, Malaysia agreed to “commence re-negotiation of the 
specific commitments” if it concludes an agreement on a negative list with a 
third country.254 This forward-looking MFN mechanism should be 
multilateralized to the AEC and the RCEP to trigger progressive 
liberalization. 
Third, the AEC allows the ASEAN Minus X formula and the 15% 
flexibility rule in services trade liberalization.255 These politically-oriented 
principles were designed to abate domestic protectionism and to stimulate 
initial liberalization under the South–South FTA. In reality, neither principle 
is clear. The ASEAN Minus X formula has led to fragmented commitments 
at different speeds. It is unclear whether a state can opt out of the 
commitments to which it first agreed if it is unable to meet the commitments 
in the implementation stage.256 Furthermore, no ASEAN agreements 
elaborate principles governing the 15% flexibility proviso, thus making it 
difficult to comprehend whether and how countries should schedule their 
services commitments based on the rule. To maximize the pro-development 
effect, it is pivotal to narrowly construe these SDT-like exceptions and base 
the intra-regional Grand Bargain on objective criteria. 
Lastly, the AEC’s single market depends on the further liberalization of 
Modes 3 and 4. Different from the EU’s top-down approach, ASEAN’s FTA-
plus path provides an optional model for the South. The salient issue for 
commercial presence negotiations is the AEC’s 70% ASEAN equity 
participation rule.257 While some member states have unilaterally increased 
the foreign equity threshold to 100%, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand 
have yet to meet the AEC target.258 A priority for AFAS negotiations is to 
minimize limitations of market access and national treatment for Mode 3, so 
that domestic regulation will not cripple the effectiveness of ASEAN equity 
commitments.259 
The Mode 4 liberalization that facilitates cross-border labor mobility 
has great potential for development due to the effect of remittances and skill 
transfer. At the WTO, most Mode 4 horizontal commitments are related to 
 
 253 Trade Policy Review, Malaysia, supra note 252, at 32, 104. 
 254 See New Zealand – Malaysia Free Trade Agreement, N.Z.-Malay., Oct. 26, 2009, art. 8.15(2) (“The 
re-negotiation shall proceed on a ‘negative list’ basis. The Parties shall endeavour to conclude the re-
negotiation on the specific commitments within 18 months from the date the negotiations commence.”). 
 255 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015, at 26 (2009). 
 256 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 352–53; Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 174, at 59–60. 
 257 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26. Note that the AEC Blueprint only 
mandates “[n]o restrictions for Modes 1 and 2.” Id. 
 258 SIRISENA DAHANAYAKE, IMPLICATIONS OF LIBERALIZING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: LEGAL, 
ACCOUNTANCY, AND ENGINEERING SERVICES IN LAO PDR, at 12 (2012); Dionisius Narjoko, AEC 
Blueprint Implementation Performance and Challenges: Services Liberalization, ERIA DISCUSSION 
PAPER SERIES, at 14 (2015). 
 259 PHILIPPA DEE, DOES AFAS HAVE BITE? COMPARING COMMITMENTS WITH ACTUAL PRACTICE,, 
at 21 (2013).  
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intra-corporate transferees and business visitors, and labor mobility is thus 
intertwined with commercial presence.260 Delinking the Mode 4 
commitments under the ASEAN MNP Agreement with Mode 3 would create 
more opportunities for independent professionals.261 Another required 
improvement lies in ASEAN states’ commitments regarding the periods of 
stay for natural persons under the agreement, which should be substantially 
GATS-plus.262 
The implicit interlocked mechanism between ASEAN intra-regional 
and extra-regional FTAs has prompted states to use a higher threshold for 
negotiations, thus making these FTAs “living” documents and ensuring the 
AEC’s integration and its impact on Asia-Pacific regionalism.263 The 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, which contains a separate chapter on 
the MNP, has the strongest GATS-plus services commitments among the 
ASEAN+1 FTAs.264 The inclusion of the MNP annex in the recent ASEAN–
India Agreement on Trade in Services also indicates the direction of the 
RCEP towards labor mobility.265 The enhanced liberalization of Modes 3 and 
4 will strengthen ASEAN’s strategy of services trade-oriented development. 
 3. Transnational Legal Harmonization and Human Rights 
Protection 
Given the crisis of the Doha Round when it came to realizing the 
development promises, the creation of the AEC illustrates an NREO 
approach to South–South cooperation and offers an alternative for trade-led 
 
 260 64.1% of Mode 4 entries in GATS schedules are related to intra-corporate transferees and business 
visitors. Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 21. The Mode 4 commitments under 
the ASEAN MNP Agreement follow the same trend. Sarah Huelser & Adam Heal, Moving Freely? 
Labour Mobility in ASEAN, ASIA PACIFIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING NETWORK ON TRADE POLICY BRIEF, 
No. 40, at 4 (2014); Flavia Jurie & Sandra Lavenex, ASEAN Economic Community: What Model for 
Labour Mobility? NCCR TRADE POLICY WORKING PAPER, No. 2015/02, at 4 (2015). 
 261 In comparison, the TPP mandates that the cross-border supply of a service not be conditioned on 
“a representative office or any form of enterprise.” The Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S.-Japan-Austl.-
Brunei-Can.-Chile-Malay.-Mex.-N.Z.-Peru-Sing.-Viet., Feb. 4, 2016, art. 10.6. 
 262 Under the GATS, “while business visitors are generally allowed to stay up to 90 days, the presence 
of intra-corporate transferees . . . tends to be limited to periods of between two and five years.” Presence 
of Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 1, 28. In ASEAN, business visitors are allowed to stay in 
the host country from 30 to 90 days and the duration of stay for intra-corporate transferees ranges between 
one month and three years. Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 8–9. 
 263 This approach reflects the practice of AFAS and ASEAN+1 services negotiations. 
 264 Razeen Sally, ASEAN FTAs: State of Play and Outlook for ASEAN’s Regional and Global 
Integration, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS, 320, 363 (Sanchita Basu 
Das et al. eds., 2013); Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, 
ASEAN-Austl.-N.Z., Feb. 27, 2009, Ch. 9. Note that the ASEAN-Japan FTA lacks services commitments.  
 265 Agreement on Trade in Services Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India, ASEAN-
India, Nov. 13, 2014, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons. 
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development. In ASEAN’s post-2015 agenda, the bloc should streamline 
WTO-plus matters with FTA policy. To maximize the development effect, 
ASEAN should promote the regional legal harmonization of mutual 
recognition and immigration rules and the legalization of human rights based 
on international labor law. This approach will hence extend the 
implementation of the SDGs from trade-led economic benefits to the 
protection of labor rights and fundamental freedoms.266 
ASEAN’s skilled labor-focused policy is applied through Mode 4 
commitments and MRAs. Falling short of the AEC goal to finalize MRAs 
for all professional services by 2015, the eight current MRAs cover less than 
2% of ASEAN’s workforce.267 In practice, the MRA provisions that mandate 
minimum years of experience have restricted the number of eligible 
professionals.268 Even meeting the MRA criteria does not guarantee 
employment due to states’ additional requirements. Consequently, there is a 
gap between regional harmonization and domestic law. 
A common obstacle is the labor market test. For instance, a Malaysian 
company seeking to recruit a foreign engineer bears the burden of proving 
the absence of local engineers for the specific project.269 Limitations on 
nationality, residency restrictions, and language requirements pose additional 
challenges.270 While Thai law accepts foreign nurses, none have been 
admitted because the licensing examination is conducted in Thai.271 
Arguably, the implementation problem also exists in bilateral FTAs. Japan’s 
FTAs with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam accept ASEAN nurses.272 
The statistics show that only three ASEAN nurses passed Japan’s nursing 
examination in 2015, which is necessary for long-term residence.273 These de 
 
 266 E.g., Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goals 8.5, 8.8, and 16.10.  
 267 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26; Guntur Sugiyarto & Dovelyn 
Rannveig Agunias, A ‘Freer’ Flow of Skilled Labour within ASEAN: Aspirations, Opportunities and 
Challenges in 2015 and Beyond, IOM-MPI Issues in Brief, No. 11 (2014), at 1. See ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 11 (ASEAN should “[e]xpand and deepen commitments under the 
ASEAN Agreement on MNP where appropriate . . . .”). 
 268 The required length of experience ranges from three to ten years. Sugiyarto & Agunias, supra note 
267, at 3. 
 269 Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 214, at 130. The Philippines also imposes the labor 
market test requirement for foreign nationals in its Labor Code. Rafaelita M. Aldaba, ASEAN Economic 
Community 2015: Labor Mobility and Mutual Recognition Arrangements on Professional Services, 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, No. 2013-04 (2013), at 4–5. 
 270 See Aldaba, supra note 269, at 3–4 (explaining that the Philippines’ Constitutional and the Foreign 
Investment Act requirements); Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 214, at 130 (stating that a foreign 
architect must reside in Malaysia for 180 days in a year). 
 271 Fukunaga, supra note 216, at 20–21. 
 272 See Ch. 3: Movement of Natural Persons 775–81, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/ 
downloadfiles/2010WTO/3-3Movement.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2015), (comparing Mode 4 commitments 
in Japan’s FTAs with seven Southeast Asian countries). 
 273 The Results of the National Nursing Exam for EPA-based Nurse Candidates (Past Seven Years), 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-10805000-Iseikyoku-Kangoka/0000079084.pdf (in 
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jure and de facto restrictions constrain the development potential for regional 
labor mobility. 
Mutual recognition is among the most difficult FTA issues. Even the 
US-led TPP simply follows the GATS model by encouraging a member state 
to “afford adequate opportunity to another” partner for negotiating an MRA, 
which should be conducted in a non-discriminatory manner.274 In contrast 
with the TPP’s nascent stage of development, the AEC framework has 
accumulated ten years of experience in implementing regional MRAs.275 
ASEAN MRAs possess the potential to provide a model for South–South 
FTAs that energize mutual recognition schemes in Asia–Pacific FTAs such 
as the RCEP and the FTAAP, which cover countries at diverse stages of 
development. 
To remedy the current weaknesses, ASEAN countries should intensify 
the legal harmonization of domestic rules. Based on common criteria, states 
should narrowly apply the MRAs’ “subject to domestic laws and regulations” 
provisions and enlarge the right of independent practice for professionals.276 
To ensure regional integration, states are obliged to increase the distinction 
between ASEAN and other foreign professionals by according the former 
more preferential treatment.277 
The legal harmonization process that will prompt the paradigm shift in 
Asia–Pacific regionalism is expected to link immigration rules to Mode 4 
commitments and MRAs. The schemes under the EU and the Trans-Tasman 
Travel Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand allow freedom of 
movement for work purposes.278 The development gap and concerns of 
illegal immigration make visa-free mechanisms infeasible for ASEAN. 
Significantly, 19 APEC members, including seven ASEAN states, participate 
in the APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC) scheme, which permits pre-
cleared business travelers short-term entry.279 The three-year valid ABTC 
also allows holders to use the express APEC lane at ports of entry, thus 
 
Japanese) (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).  
 274 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), supra note 128, at art. 10.9; General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (1994), supra note 164, at art. VII. 
 275 The first ASEAN MRA, which governs on Engineering Services, was concluded in 2005. See also 
ASEAN Services Integration Report (2015), supra note 32, at 34 (“To date, there are a total of 1,252 
engineers on the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineers Register . . . .”). 
 276 E.g., ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Nursing Services (2006), arts. 3.2; ASEAN 
MRA on Engineering Services (2005), art. 3.3. See Fukunaga, supra note 216, at 16 (stating that unlike 
the EU, “[t]he ASEAN MRA in principle does not give a right for independent practice. Actually, Vietnam 
is the only ASEAN country that allows independent practice.”). 
 277 See Fukunaga, supra note 216, at 21 (observing that most ASEAN states “do not distinguish 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN in their respective regulatory frameworks”). 
 278 For the introduction to the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, see ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
INSTITUTE, LABOR MIGRATION, SKILLS & STUDENT MOBILITY IN ASIA 37 (2014). 
 279 Among the 21 APEC economies, only Canada and the United States are transitional members and 
have not yet joined the scheme. APEC Business Travel Card, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-
APEC/Business-Resources/APEC-Business-Travel-Card.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
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cutting time spent at immigration checkpoints by 52.4%.280 
While the transplantation of the APEC-like “ASEAN lane” at customs 
will improve labor mobility, the region can benefit more from a visa system 
that extends beyond a temporary stay for business visitors. The AEC’s 
implementation of facilitating “the issuance of visas and employment passes 
for ASEAN professionals” can be modeled after NAFTA and the U.S. FTA 
with Singapore.281 The “Trade NAFTA” visa (known as the TN visa) for 
Canadians and Mexicans ties U.S. employment with renewable visas.282 The 
United States–Singapore FTA created separate quotas for US H-1B work 
visas allocated to Singaporean nationals.283 Based on these models, it is 
recommended that ASEAN design a pan-ASEAN professional visa scheme 
that allocates the visa quotes subject to negotiations. The scheme would 
harmonize domestic immigration rules and deepen the implementation of 
Mode 4 commitments and MRAs. 
Other than the legal harmonization efforts, ASEAN’s breakthrough in 
Asia–Pacific FTAs lies in facilitating and managing the flow of migrant 
workers in the post-2015 agenda. The AEC has liberalized the movement of 
professionals. The legitimacy of the services trade-oriented development 
policy requires the expansion of “beneficiaries” of the regional integration 
by incorporating low-skilled labor. As in other regions, a political paradox 
has often arisen from the struggle between resistance to migrant workers and 
the shortage of labor undertaking the 3D (dirty, dangerous, and demanding) 
jobs necessary for economic development.284 
From a legal perspective, the ASEAN Charter that legalizes the AEC 
does not exclude low-skilled labor from ASEAN’s single market.285 The 
current skilled labor-centered scheme is not sustainable because it ignores 
the reality that more than 87% of intra-ASEAN workers are semi-skilled or 
unskilled.286 More fundamentally, facilitating the temporary movement of 
migrant workers will yield “the greatest absolute and poverty-related gains 
 
 280 APEC’s Achievements in Trade Facilitation in 2007-2010: Final Assessment of the Second Trade 
Facilitation Action (TFAP II) (2012), at 1. 
 281 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 29. 
 282 See Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190, at 281 (“When proof of a job offer is demonstrated, 
the TN visa permits employment for one year, with unlimited renewal.”); Philip Martin & Manolo Abella, 
supra note 194, at 13 (“There has never been a quota on the number of TN visas available for Canadian, 
but there was a 5,500 a year quota on TN visas available for Mexicans between 1994 and 2005.”). 
 283See USTR on Professional Workers in Chile, Singapore FTAs, July 23, 2003, 
http://singapore.usembassy.gov/072303a.html (stating that under the FTA, the number of Singaporean 
professionals in the United States is limited to 5,400). 
 284 See Jason Ng, Richer Asean Nations Resist Opening Doors to Migrant Workers, WALL STREET J., 
Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323646604578402283145126480 
(discussing the situations in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand). 
 285 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007), art. 1:5. 
 286 Sugiyarto & Agunias, supra note 267, at 4. 
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for developing countries” and reduce ASEAN’s development gap.287 Given 
the estimated increase of low-skilled occupations by 62.4% and the urgent 
labor shortage problem, it is timely to construct a mechanism to manage the 
flow of migrant workers based on the best practices of FTAs.288 
Markedly, the human rights dimension of the SDGs can also be 
implemented through the labor rights protection under the AEC framework. 
As merely 17% of GATS entries encompass low-skilled workers, ASEAN’s 
WTO-plus mechanism will provide a new trade–development paradigm.289 
Labor commitments are stressed in the IAI, the ASEAN Declaration on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, and the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration.290 However, the economic aim and human rights 
aspirations are disconnected. Although the two declarations identify the 
obligations of states, their soft-law nature and the absence of an enforcement 
mechanism limit their practical value. 
As an effective approach to labor protection, ASEAN countries have 
concluded bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) or memoranda of 
understanding that incorporate paramount principles of International Labour 
Organization (ILO) conventions.291 Presumably, the BLAs that provide for 
the movement of low-skilled labor have circumvented the MFN effect of the 
GATS and led to a different type of “noodle bowl” effect.292 Some may argue 
that domestic labor law enforcement suffices to achieve the goal of 
facilitating the movement of labor. This argument neglects the practice of 
excluding certain categories of labor, such as domestic maids, from 
employment legislation and the work injury compensation scheme.293 
 
 287 Abrenica, supra note 144, at 354; Feeny & McGillivray, supra note 188, at 117. 
 288 Laura Brewer, LABOUR MOBILITY AND SKILLS RECOGNITION: LESSONS FOR ASEAN, PowerPoint 
Slides (2014), at 6; Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 31; LABOR MIGRATION, SKILLS & STUDENT 
MOBILITY IN ASIA (2014), supra note 278, at 42. 
 289 See Arti Grover Goswami & Sebastián Sáez, How Well Have Trade Agreements Facilitated 
Temporary Mobility, in LET WORKERS MOVE: USING BILATERAL LABOR AGREEMENTS TO INCREASE 
TRADE IN SERVICES 17, 25 (Sebastián Sáez ed., 2013) (explaining the scope of Mode 4 commitments 
under the GATS). 
 290 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 107; ASEAN Declaration on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2007); ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
(2012), para. 27. 
 291 E.g., Memorandum of Understanding between Trade Unions in Cambodia and Trade Unions in 
Thailand on Protection of Migrant Workers’ Rights (2013); LABOR MIGRATION, SKILLS & STUDENT 
MOBILITY IN ASIA (2014), supra note 278, at 43. 
 292 The feature of Asian noodle bowl or spaghetti bowl commonly refers to fragmented rules of origin 
under FTAs. For an analysis if the bilateral labor agreements’ potential violation of the most-favored-
nation clause of the GATS, see Arti Grover Goswami et al., When and Why Should Bilateral Labor 
Agreements be Used, in LET WORKERS MOVE: USING BILATERAL LABOR AGREEMENTS TO INCREASE 
TRADE IN SERVICES 39, 45–46 (Sebastián Sáez ed., 2013); Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190, at 
290. 
 293 For instance, “domestic workers” are excluded from Singapore’s Employment Act and the Work 
Injury Compensation Act. Employment Act (Ch. 91), art. 2(1) (Singapore); Work Injury Compensation 
Act (Ch. 354), Fourth Schedule: Classes of Persons Not Covered (Singapore). 
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Despite domestic courts’ recognition of “a matter of public interest,” the 
vulnerable status of foreign workers has contributed to prevalent incidents of 
labor abuses in the region.294 
While it is not unique for South–South FTAs to include labor 
cooperation, the challenge is to make such cooperation operative by 
balancing economic need and human rights protection.295 ASEAN can 
demonstrate the best practices for the NREO approach by incorporating labor 
commitments into the multilateral AEC and RCEP frameworks. Richer 
ASEAN countries’ resistance to labor provisions cannot stand, as they are 
committed to the TPP’s labor protection modeled after U.S. FTAs.296 
For development purposes, the AEC should oblige states to enforce 
ASEAN Declarations in domestic laws. The 1998 ILO Declaration, based on 
eight key conventions, requires states’ compliance with fundamental labor 
principles.297 These principles, incorporated in ASEAN Declarations, include 
freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the prohibition 
of forced labor, child labor, and discrimination in employment.298 
Nonetheless, only Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines ratified all of the 
fundamental ILO conventions.299 The transformation of regional 
commitments into domestic legislation will elevate human rights protection 
and complement the overall development of the ASEAN Community. 
Built on the best practices of the BLAs, multilateral labor cooperation 
under the AEC is advised to strengthen the public–private partnership to 
allocate visa quotas, streamline the recruitment process, and ensure the 
embassies’ assistance in labor disputes.300 The integrated capacity building 
 
 294 E.g., ADG v. Public Prosecutor & Other Appeal, [2010] 1 SLR 874, 897, para. 55; see also Maid 
to Order: Ending Abuses against Migrant Domestic Workers in Singapore, 17: 10(c) HUM. RTS. WATCH 
1, 1 (2005) (“Between 1999 and 2005, at least 147 migrant domestic workers died from workplace 
accidents or suicide, most by jumping or falling from residential buildings.”); Trinna Leong, ‘Forced 
labor’ Rife in Malaysian Electronics Factories: Report, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-malaysia-labour-report-idUSKBN0HC08E20140917 (“One in five immigrants were working 
more than the suggested 60 hours of overtime a week . . . .”). 
 295 E.g. Free Trade Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Chile, China-Chile, Nov. 18, 2005, art. 108. 
 296 These countries include Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia. For labor enforcement issues, see The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), supra note 191, Ch. 19; MARY JANE BOLLE, OVERVIEW OF LABOR 
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 4–6 
(2014).  
 297 The Declaration requires all International Labour Organization (ILO) members, “even if they have 
not ratified the Conventions in question,” to comply with four core labor principles. ILO, 1998 Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (June 1998), art. 2.  
 298 Id.; ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2007), 
Obligations of Receiving States; ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2012), paras. 3, 6, 27. 
 299 For ASEAN’s countries’ ratification status in the eight ILO conventions, see Martin & Abella, 
supra note 194, at 28. 
 300 See generally Chanda, supra note 149, at 482–92; LABOR MIGRATION, SKILLS & STUDENT 
MOBILITY IN ASIA (2014), at 43. This process also helps eliminate undocumented workers. 
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and development assistance initiatives under FTAs that raise awareness of 
labor rights are also integral to ASEAN’s legalization of trade–development 
policy. These mechanisms not only reduce the transaction costs for regional 
labor utilization, but also strengthen the trade–development connection in 
line with the SDGs. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
Trade–development discourse intertwined with North–South conflicts 
has been at the core of multilateral trade negotiations and international 
economic law. The SDGs of the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable 
Development mandate the revitalization of development in the Doha Round 
negotiations. Nevertheless, a misconception of SDTs has rendered the 
WTO’s development promises unpromising. The crisis on the disconnection 
between development goals and the Doha Round requires a feasible “Plan B” 
for the Global South. 
By reassessing the trade–development nexus, this article provides the 
first analysis of an approach to accomplishing the SDGs through regional 
integration. It argued that the NREO will fortify the coalition of developing 
countries in expediting the legalization of trade–development policy. The 
article thus moves the conventional debate to a new dimension on the 
assertive role of developing countries and responds to an inquiry of the 
paradigm shift in Asia–Pacific regionalism, with interrelated theoretical and 
substantive claims. This article used the realist and dependency theories to 
explain the geopolitical complexity of the NREO, built upon the rapidly 
evolving South–South FTAs. While realism justified rare international 
cooperation in the arenas of overlapping national interests, the new 
dependency theory deciphered the transformation of neo-colonial economic 
ties. 
As a timely case study, this paper focused on the creation of the AEC 
and its implications for global trade powers such as the United States, China, 
and Japan. It examined the bloc’s incremental process of liberalization and 
its balance of power strategy to alter the hub-and-spoke structure. The 
proposed services trade-oriented development policy encompasses integral 
components of intra-regional and extra-regional services commitments and 
transnational schemes on labor mobility. The post-2015 agenda is advised to 
center on the integration of development assistance and removal of domestic 
barriers. Moreover, essential actions should include the transnational legal 
harmonization of mutual recognition and immigration rules, as well as 
linking the FTAs with human rights protection that incorporates international 
labor principles. These structural movements would provide the best 
practices for global regionalism and reinvigorate the trade–development 
connection in the multilateral trading system. 
 
